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I. INTRODUCTION 
When an elementary or secondary school student is harassed at 
school, the harassment is likely to interfere with the student's educa-
tion. If such harassment is motivated by the victim's race or gender, it 
constitutes a form or race or gender discrimination because the victim 
Q Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAw REVIEW. 
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subjected to different conditions based on race or gender. Because 
educational institutions may not deprive students of equal educa-
bOOal opportunities based on race or gender, school officials have a 
duty to address such harassment. This duty becomes more obvious 
when school officials, such as teachers, are directly involved in the 
harassment than when fellow students are engaged in the harassing 
conduct. Peer harassment in schools raises difficult legal issues be-
cause fellow students rather than school officials are the problem, at 
least initially. Thus, the issue is whether schools and their officials 
can be held liable for the inequality in educational opportunity that 
results from peer harassment. This article suggests the answer 
should be yes. A second, less complex issue is whether the students 
responsible for the harassment, or at least their parents, can be held 
liable. • In addressing these issues, it is necessary to distinguish be-
tween public and private schools because some of the relevant laws 
apply only to government officials and entities.2 
Accordingly, and to lay the foundation, the well-documented exis-
tence of racial and sexual harassment in secondary and elementary 
schools will be summarized in section II of this article. Prevention of 
harassment will be discussed in section Ill, with emphasis on the effi-
cacy of strong policies, accompanying education, and prompt correc-
tive action by school officials to ensure students harassment-free 
educational opportunities. 
Finally, section IV will discuss the potential remedies for the stu-
dent victims of student harassment in schools. First, victims of such 
harassment may have claims against the students who actually en-
gaged in the harassment, based on civil rights statutes and common 
law tort theories. Second, victims may have state law claims that seek 
to hold parents liable for the actions of their children. In many situa-
tions, neither the students nor their parents will be able to satisfy a 
judgment, so victims will attempt to hold schools and school officials 
liable. A key to holding schools and their officials liable is a showing 
that they knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to 
take prompt, appropriate corrective action. However, as mentioned 
before, elementary and secondary schools have an affirmative duty to 
1. Because students arc less likely than the !1Chool corporation, or even !ICbool offi-
cials, to have the resources to satisfy a substantial judgment, they are less attrac-
tive defendants. In some states, parents can be held responsible for the torts of 
thetr children, at least up to a certain amount. See, e.g., bm. CouE § 34-31-4-1 
(1998). 
2. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution applies only to slate and local governm<'nt actors. Similarly, the 
civil rights statute pursuant to which the Fourt<'enth Amendment is enforced, 42 
U.S.C. § 1983, requires action under stale law. Private schools would generally 
not satisfy the "state action" requirement. See e.g., Rendell-Bakcr v. Kobo, 457 
u.s. 830 (] 982). 
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provide all children with an equal educational opportunity; that duty 
includes identifying and removing harassment from all schools, both 
public and private. 
II. NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE PROBLEM 
While the actual extent of racial and sexual harassment in elemen-
tary and secondary schools is not clear, reliable information suggests 
that a problem exists. This is evident from the fact that the U.S. De-
partment of Education (DOE), the federal agency with the responsibil-
ity of enforcing two federal statutes that prohibit race and sex 
discrimination in education, has published a "guidance" addressing 
each of these two types ofharassment. In its 1994Racial Harassment 
Guidance, the DOE stated, "[t]he existence of racial incidents and har-
assment on the basis of race, color, or national origin against students 
is disturbing and of major concern to the Department."3 A few years 
later, in its Sexual Harassment Guidance, the DOE noted: 
The elimination ofl'exual harassment of students in frot>rally asstst('() edu-
cational programs is a high priority for !the Office of Civil Rights). Through 
its enforcement of Title IX, OCR has learned that a significant number of stu-
dents, both male and ft>male, have experienced sexual haras,ment, that sex-
ual harassment can interfere with a student's academic performance and 
emotional and phy~:~ical well-being, and that preventing and rcmt'dying sexual 
harassment in schools is essential to ensure nondiscriminatory, safe environ-
ment.<~ in which students can learn.4 
This represents an official recognition that both racial and sexual har-
assment are sufficiently prevalent in schools to warrant a specific gui-
dance addressing each form of harassment. 
A frequently-cited study, "Hostile Hallways: The AAUW Survey on 
Sexual Harassment in America's Schools,"5 presents the following 
"Big Picture": 
Tht> startling findings on l'exual hara.<~!'lment in The AAUW Report: How 
&hools ShortchanRe G1rls compelled the AAUW Educational Foundation to 
undertake further research. We wanted to a.<l-"e"l:l the extent of sexual harru;. ... 
ment m America's schools and, even more important, the effccl8 of that har-
o.ssment on our children. 
AAUW commissioned one of this country's most n·spected survey re-.earch 
firms, Louis Harris and Associates, to ensure that the survey's methodology, 
implt'mentation, and questionnaire would meet the highest standards of the 
survey research community. The survey was design('() to provide a profile of 
3. Racial Incident!! and Harassment Again;;t Students at Educational Institutions: 
lnvc:;tigabve Guidance, 59 Fed. Reg. 11,448 <March 10, 1994) (hereinafter Racial 
Harassment Guidance]. 
4. Sexual Harassmf:'nt Guidance: Harassment of Students by School Employees, 
Other Students, or Third Parties; Notice, 62 F<'d. Reg. 12,033, 12,034 (March 13, 
1997) lhereinafl.er Sexual Harassment Gutdance) 
5. American Association of University Women EducatiOnal Foundation, Hostile 
Hallways: The AAUW Survey on Sexual Harassment in America's Schools ( 1993 
[hereinafter AAUW Survey). 
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the problem of sexual harassment in school and answer many of the questions 
about school-based sexual harassment. In addition to measuring the extent of 
sexual harassment in school, AAUW was determined to identify the educa-
tional, emotional and behavioral impact of sexual hara.c;sment on our nation's 
schoolchildren. 
The results of this survey form a bleak picture: 4 out of 5 students have 
experienced some form of sexual harassment in school. And while the impact 
of sexual harassment in school is significant for all students, girls suffer 
greater effects than boys. Further, the level of sexual harassment of boys is 
surprisingly high. 
For many, the analysis that follows will confirm their worst fears about 
sexual harassment in school; for others, the results will be surprising and 
shocking. 
What will be clear to all is that sexual harassment in America's schools 
affects-even disables- girls and boys alike. 
What remains is the challenge facing students, teachers, and parents to 
ensure that the behaviors detailed in this survey do not continue.6 
According to the AAUW survey, most of the harassment occurs in 
the public areas of school facilities-in the halls, the classrooms, on 
school grounds, in the cafeteria, or on school transportation. 7 The 
harassment creates a substantial educational impact, with victims not 
wanting to go to school, not wanting to talk as much in class, finding it 
hard to pay attention in school, staying home or cutting classes, mak-
ing lower grades on tests and in class, and finding it hard to study.s 
Harassment also has an emotional impact, with victims feeling em-
barrassed, feeling self-conscious, being less sure of themselves or less 
confident, feeling afraid or scared, doubting whether they can have a 
happy romantic relationship, and feeling confused about who they 
are.9 The AAUW survey also addressed the behavioral impact ofhar-
assment.lo Another important finding in the AAUW survey shows 
"that students do not routinely report sexual harassment incidents to 
adults" and "most reporting takes place on a peer-to-peer basis."n 
Other evidence, although not gathered as systematically as the 
AAUW survey, supports the above conclusions. Examples, often out-
rageous, are found in reported cases,12 law review articlest3 and 
6. ld. at 4. 
7. See id. at 12-14. 
8. See id. at 15-16. 
9. See id. at 16-17. 
10. See id. at 17-18. 
11. /d. at 14. 
12. See, e.g., Davis v. Monroe County Bd. ofEduc., 526 U.S. 629 (1999); Soper ex rel. 
Soper v. Hoben, 195 F.3d 845 (6th Cir. 1999); Murrell v. School Dist. No. 1, Den-
ver, CO, 186 F.3d 1238 (lOth Cir. 1999); Bruneau ex rel. Schofield v. South Kort-
right Cent. Sch. Dist., 163 F.3d 749 (2d Cir. 1998); Monteiro v. Tempe Union 
High Sch. Dist., 158 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 1998); Morse v. Regents of the Univ. of 
Colo., 154 F.3d 1124 (lOth Cir. 1998); Oona R.-S.- by Kate S. v. McCaffrey, 143 
F.3d 473, opinion amended and reh'g denied, __ F.3d __ , 1998 WL 216944 
(9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied 119 S. Ct. 2039 (1999); Franks v. Kentucky Sch. for 
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oewspaper articles. a While some may question whether student-stu-
dent harassment should result in litigation, the fact that these inci-
dents often end up in court demonstrates that other avenues of relief 
are not available. Many of the injuries and much of the litigation 
could be avoided if school officials would treat racial and sexual har-
ment as a serious matter and address it accordingly. As with many 
problems, prevention is the best remedy. 
the Deaf, 142 F.3d 360 (6th Cir. 1998); Bosley v. Kearney R-1 Sch. Dist., 140 F .3d 
776 (8th Cir. 1998); Doe v. University of Ill., 138 F.3d 653 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. 
granU>d and opimon uacated 119 S. Ct. 2016 (1999); Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. 
Sch. Dist., 80 F .3d 1006 (5th Cir. 1996); Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 54 F .3d 
1447 (9th Cir. 1995); Doe v. Londonderry Sch. Dist. 970 F. Supp. 64 (D.N.H. 
1997); Does v. Covington County Sch. Bd., 969 F. Supp. 1264 (N.D. Ala. 1997); 
Nicole M. v. Martinez Unified Sch. Dist., 964 F. Supp. 1369 (N.D. Cal. 1997); 
CoJJier v. William Penn Sch. Dist., 956 F. Supp. 1209 (E.D. Pa. 1997); Wright v. 
Mason City Community Sch. Dist., 940 F. Supp. 1412 (N.D. Iowa 1996); Burrow 
v. Postville Community Sch. Dist., 929 F. Supp. 1193 (N D. Iowa 1996); Mennone 
v. Gordon, 889 F. Supp. 53 (D. Conn. 1995); Garza v. Galena Park lndep. Sch. 
Dist., 914 F . Supp. 1437 (S.D. Tex. 1994); Elliott v. New Miami Bd. ofEduc., 799 
F. Supp. 818 <S.D. Ohio 1992). 
13. See, e.g., VernaL. Williams & Deborah L. Brake, When a Kiss Isn't Just a Kiss: 
Title IX and Student-to-Stucknt Harassment, 30 CREIGHTON L. REv. 423 (1997); 
Deborah Austem Colson, Safe Enough to Learn: Placing an A{firmatwe Duty of 
Protection on Public Schools Unckr 42 U.S. C. Section 1983, 30 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 169 (1995); Helena K. Dolan, The Fourth R-Respect: Combatting Peer Sex-
ual Harassment in the Public Schools, 63 FoRDHAM L. REv. 215 (1994); Elizabeth 
J. Gant, Applying Title VII ·Hostile Work Environment• Analysls to Title IX of the 
Education Amendments of 1972-An Auenue of Relief for Victims of Student-to-
Student Sexual Harassment in the Schools, 98 DICK. L. REv. 489 (1994); Stacey R. 
Rinestine, Terronsm on the Playground: What Can Be Done?, 32 DuQ. L. REv. 799 
(1994); Gail Sorenson, Peer Sexual Harassment: Remedies and Guidelines Under 
Federal Law, 92 Eouc. L. REP. 1 (1994); Karen Me II encamp Davis, Reading, Writ-
ing, and Sexual Haro88ment: Finding a ConstitutlOnal Remedy When Schools 
Fall to Address Peer Abuse, 69 bro. L.J. 1123 (1994); Carrie N. Baker, Proposed 
Title IX Guldelines on Sex-Based Harassment of Students, 43 EMORY L.J. 271 
(1994); Stefanic H. Roth, Sex Discrimination 101: Developing a Title IX Analysts 
for S exual Harassment in Education, 23 J .L. & Eouc. 459 (1994); Adam Michael 
Greenfield, Annte Get Your Gun 'Cause Help Ain't Comm': The Need for Constitu-
tional Protectum from Peer Abuse in Public Schools, 43 DuKE L.J . 588 (1993); 
Monica L. Sherer, No Longer Just Child's Play: School Liabillty Under Title IX 
for Peer Sexual Harassment, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 2119 (1993); JoAnn Strauss, Peer 
Sexual Harassment of High School Students: A Reasonable Student Standard 
and an Affirmatit·e Duty Imposed on Educational InstttutlOns, 10 LAw & IISt:Q. J . 
163 (1992); Jollce Faber, Expanding Title IX of the Education Amendments of 
1972 to Prohibit Student to Student Sexual Harassment, 2 UCLA Wor.u:N's L.J. 
85 (1992). 
14. See, e.g., Tamar Lewin, Students Seeking Damages for Sex Bias, N.Y. TrMES, July 
15, 1994, at B7; Deborah L. Rhode, You Must Remember Thts, NAT'L L.J ., October 
28, 1996, at A21; Adam Nossiter, Six-Year-Old's Sex Cnme: Innocent Peck on 
Cheek, N.Y. fun:s, September 27, 1996, at A9; Judy Mann, What's Harassment? 
A~k a Girl, WASn . PoST, June 23, 1993, at D26; Leora Tannenbaum, Sluts and 
Suits, IN THESE TIMES, May 13, 1996. at 33; Jane Gross, Schools Our Newest 
Arenas for Sex-Haro88ment Issues, N.Y. TIMEs, March 11, 1992, at BS. 
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III. PREVENTION 
Those in the best position to prevent harassment are parents, 
teachers, and others who are responsible for teaching school-age chil-
dren about respect. However, schools also have an important role to 
play because of their obligation to provide an equal educational oppor-
tunity. Racial and sexual harassment by students should be ad-
dressed as part of a school's code of conduct, just like physical abuse 
and violence. Such harassment should be taken as seriously as a 
punch in the face. Most school officials will not tolerate students who 
strike other students in the face; however, they are often more toler-
ant of students who harass other students. Part of this is inherent in 
the nature of harassment because, unlike other types ofharm, harass-
ment usually does not leave any evidence, like blood and bruises, of 
the wrongful act. Therefore, when a student alleges harassment, a 
dispute often occurs over whether the alleged incident actually 
happened. 
The difference can be demonstrated by comparing two types of 
cases involving alleged discrimination in employment. Where one em-
ployee claims she was discharged because of her race or gender, usu-
ally the parties can agree to one fact-that she was discharged-and 
address whether it was due to race or gender. In contrast, when an 
employee claims she was racially or sexually harassed in the work-
place, the employer frequently denies the occurrence of the alleged 
harassment. Because frequently no physical manifestations of the 
harm caused by racial or sexual harassment exist,u; there is a ten-
dency to discount the allegation and question whether anything inap-
propriate really happened and, if so, whether real harm occurred. 
Mental and emotional injuries are more difficult to detect. Nearly 
everyone has experienced physical pain, and can identify with it. 
15. At least, there is not an immediate physical reaction, like a bloody nose, that is 
easily traceable to the blow to the nose. However, this docs not mean that har-
a~sment does not lead to physical injuries. See, e.g., Rosun· J. SHOOP & JACK W. 
lLwuow, JR., SEXUAL HAlu\SSMF.:-IT IN OUR Sc uom.<> 64-67 (1994); MicJrF.LE A. 
PALum & RicHARD B. BAKJCK!IIAN, AcAD£r.uc ANU WoRKPJ.ACF: SEXliAL lliRASs -
lllEI"'r 27-34 (1991); M ICH.EJ..J:; A- PAI,tmi, IvoRY P owt:K: Sr-:xUAT 'HARASSMENT O'l 
CAMPUS 78-80, 97-98 & 112-13 (1990); JulieS. Lu, Rowinsky v. Bryan Indepen-
dent School District: Does Title IX Impose Liability on Schools for Student-to-
Student Sexual Harassment?, 42 VILL. L. REV. 969 (1997); Alexandra A. Bodnar, 
Arming Student.~ for Battle: Amendinf{ Title IX to Combat the Sexual Harassment 
of Students by Students in Primary and Secondary School, 5 S. CAl .. REV. L. & 
Wo11rvN's STU!>. 549, 561 (1996}; Jollee Faber, Expanding Title IX of the Educa-
tion Amendments of 1972 to Prohibit Student to Student Sexual Harassment, 2 
UCLA WoMF.'l's L.J. 85, 97 C1992). 
Aside from physical inJuries, there is often an immediate psychological reac-
tion. See, e.g., Murrell v. School Dist. No. 1, Dem•er, CO, 186 F.3d 1238, 1244 
(10th Cir. 1999) (stating that victim began to engage in self-destructive and sui-
cidal behavior). 
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However, many people have not experienced discrimination or harass-
ment and have not made an effort to understand the mental, emo-
tional, and physical harm it can cause. This is evident when people 
suggest that no clear line exists between "teasing" and actionable har-
assment. Such an attitude can easily lead school officials to question 
the need for preemptive policies and to be cavalier in their treatment 
of harassment complaints made by victims. 
Nevertheless. school officials have at least three incentives for 
adopting a meaningful policy prohibiting racial and sexual harass-
ment. First, they should be interested in promoting respect (the 
fourth R)I6 for fellow students. This can be accomplished through pos-
itive steps as well as a policy against behavior that shows a lack of 
respect. Second, school officials have an affirmative duty to provide 
an equal educational opportunity by removing any barriers based on 
race or gender. Third, schools should be interested in avoiding litiga-
tion and liability arising out of peer harassment. By analogy to cases 
involving sexual harassment that creates a hostile work environ-
ment,l7 the existence of a policy may be a factor in determining 
whether the school corporation is liable. The latter possibly provides 
the most powerful incentive because it more easily and directly trans-
lates into financial terms. Whatever the motivation, no school should 
be without a comprehensive policy related to racial and sexual harass-
ment of students by students, as well as by teachers and other school 
employees. 
Any such policy should appear in a prominent place in the student 
handbook and address all peer harassment even though certain types 
of harassment may not lead to legal liability, at least not under civil 
rights laws.1s While the policy uses the term "harassment," it could 
16. See Helena K. Dolan, The Fourth R-Respect: Combattmg Peer Sexual Harass-
ment in the Public &hools, 63 FotwHA;\t L. REv. 215 (1994). 
17. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2268-70 
(1998)(cittng sexual harassment tn employment by supervisors); see al!IO Farley v. 
American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 115 F .3d 1548, 1554-55 (11th Cir. 1997)(di!lcussing 
company's liability for harassment by co-workers); Bonenberger v. Plymouth 
Transp., 132 F.3d 20, 26-27 (3d Cir. 1997)(analyzing liability for harassment by 
oo-workersl; Harris v. L&L Wings, Inc., 132 F.3d 978,982 (4th Cir. 1997Kdiscuss-
ing liability for harassment by co-workers). 
18. While any harassment rn school can interfere with an education, only those char-
acteristics covered by federal law-i.e. race, national origin, sex, or disability-
are actionable under the federal civil right'! laws. All forms of haras~ment may 
be actionable under state law. Another advantage of addressing all peer harass-
ment in a school policy is that it helps avoid the kunderinclusiv('~ argument relied 
upon by the majority in RA. V. u. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (19921. In that case a St. 
Paul ordmance regulating ~ate speech" was found unconstitutional lx-cause it 
addressed only "fighting words~ directed at someone because of their race, color, 
creed, religion or gender. St. Paul, 505 U.S. at 384. Th~refore, a more general 
policy is less susceptible to a First Amendment challenge. 
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be defined as "interference"19 because, in the context of education, the 
real evil of harassment lies in its interference with an equal educa-
tional opportunity. 
The following represents the basic structure of a policy that, with 
changes in the language to reflect the ages of the students, may be 
appropriate for elementary and secondary schools. 
It is the policy of the school to promote respect for students, teachers, ad-
ministrators and staff. Further, it is the goal of the school to provide an envi-
ronment conducive to learning in which all students have an equal 
opportunity to learn and develop. Student harassment of other students 
shows a lack of respect and interferes with the opportunity to learn and de-
velop. Therefore, harassment of other students will not be tolerated and, if 
proved, will lead to disciplinary action. 
In order for school officials to deal with those students who harass other 
students, it is important that the targets or victims of such harassment report 
it promptly. Also, students who observe harassment directed at others should 
report it. If anyone treats you differently because you reported harassment or 
cooperated in an investigation of harassment, please report the different 
treatment so we can protect you. Such retaliatory action constitutes a sepa-
rate violation of the code of conduct and may lead to separate disciplinary 
action. 
Any school employee who observes, or otherwise becomes aware of, harass-
ment of students, must report it promptly to --------
Harassment is defined as any conduct that is sufficiently severe, pervasive 
or persistent to interfere with or limit the ability of a student to participate in 
or benefit from school programs, services and actiVlties. Such harassmg con-
duct may be physical, verbal, graphic or written. 
If you believe you are a victim of harassment by other students, or have 
reason to believe another student is being harassed, you should report this to 
the Office of the Principal, a teacher, a counselor, a school nurse, your par-
ents, or [alternatives, such as designated students). After you report the infor-
mation, an investigation will be undertaken promptly and, if there is reason to 
believe harassment took place, corrective or remedial action will be taken and 
disciplinary proceedings will be initiated in accordance with § __ . 
The person(s) designated to accept charges of harassment should 
be trained so the victim is not made to feel like the wrongdoer.2o A 
19. This is based, in part, on a provision in the Fair Housing Act which states: 
[it is] unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any per-
son in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his having exercised 
or enjoyed, or on account of his having aided or encouraged any other 
person in the exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by 
(other provisions of the Act). 
42 U.S.C. § 3617 (1983). Similarly, the Americans with Disabilities Act states: 
[it is] unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any indi-
vidual in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his or her having 
exercised or enjoyed, or on account of his or her having aided or en-
couraged any other individual in the exercise or enjoyment of, any right 
granted or protected by this Act. 
42 u.s.c. § 12203(b) (1997). 
20. The AAUW Survey, supra note 5, at 14, indicates that harassment in school is 
underreported, at least to school officials. Victims "do not routinely report sexual 
harassment incidents to adults," and only "7% of sexually harassed students say 
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referral to the school counselor may be required, depending on how 
traumatic the incident was to the victim.21 A determination of 
whether the reported conduct constitutes harassment should be re-
served until the investigation is completed. The worst response by 
any school official notified of student harassment would be one that 
suggests the matter is not taken seriously by school officials. This 
message can be communicated in a number of ways, including the fail-
ure to do anything, a suggestion that such behavior is acceptable 
("boys will be boys"), a suggestion that the complaining party must 
have invited the action, or a suggestion that the victim should be able 
to deal with the conduct.22 A comparison to the student complaining 
of a punch in the face is appropriate because it is unlikely a school 
official will send the message that such physical abuse is not taken 
seriously. 
In adopting policies, taking preventative measures, and imposing 
discipline for harassment, public schools must be aware of potential 
First and Fourteenth Amendment issues.23 Because harassment can 
they have told a teacher about the experience, with girls twice as Likely as boys to 
have done this." Id. Students are far more likely to report harassment to a 
friend , with the study showing that 63% of the victims told a friend. See id. A 16-
year-old white female is quoted as saying, "I wasn't dressed very provocative and 
I gave them no reason to harass me. I was upset the administration didn't re-
spond immediately after I complained. I was told to ignore the harassers." !d. 
In its guidance on sexual harassment, the Office of Civil Rights (OCR) says: 
[t]raining for administrators, teachers, and staff and age-appropriate 
classroom information for students can help to ensure that they under-
stand what types of conduct can cause sexual harassment and that they 
know bow to respond . ... Finally, the school must make sure that all 
designated employees have adequate training as to what conduct consti-
tutes sexual harassment and are able to explain how the grievance pro-
cedure operates. 
Sexual Harassment Guidance, supra note 4, at 12,044, 12,045 (1997). The OCR 
found that a coUege violated Title IX "in part because the person identified by the 
school as the Title IX coordinator \\'as unfamiliar with Title IX, had no training, 
and did not even realize he was the coordinator." ld. at 12,051 n.91. 
21. See, e.g., Sexual Harassment Guidance, supra note 4, at 12,045 (slating that the 
victim of harassment cannot be expected to work out the problem directly with 
the alleged harassers without appropriate involvement by school officials like 
counselors, trained mediators, teachers, or administrators). 
22. After she complained to t.be Superintendent and Title IX compliance officer, in 
Niles u. Nelson, 72 F. Supp. 2d 13, 15 (N.D.N.Y. 1999), the student-victim was 
suspended for "making a false report" and the suspension was upheld by the 
Board of Education. See also MurreU v. School Dist. No.1, Denver, CO, 186 F.3d 
1238, 1244 (10th Cir. 1999)(noting that the victim, a developmentally and physi-
cally disabled high school student, was suspended by the principal for "[b]ehavior 
which is detrimental to the welfare, safety, or morals of other pupils or school 
personnel," after the principal suggested the sexual contact may have been con-
sensual even though the boy admitted assaulting the victim after she resisted his 
advances). 
23. The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees freedom of speech and 
expressive association. While the First Amendment refers only to Congress, it 
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sometimes qualify as an expression of one's opposition to racial and/or 
gender equality, efforts to suppress such expression may be chal-
lenged as a violation of the right to freedom of speech guaranteed by 
the First Amendment. While not intended as an exhaustive discus-
sion of the First Amendment issue, the following provides at least an 
introduction to the arguments. 
Much has been written about harassing speech, sometimes re-
ferred to as "hate speech."24 A student disciplined for harassing an-
other student may challenge the school policy or its application as a 
content-based restriction of speech- because it regulates a particular 
ubject matter - or a viewpoint-based restriction, because it estab-
lishes an acceptable view of racial or gender equality.2n Normally 
courts subject such a restriction on speech to strict scrutiny, which 
requires the government to show (1) a compelling interest or purpose 
served by the restrictions, and (2) that the regulation is narrowly tai-
lored to achieve that governmental interest or purpose.26 Strict scru-
tiny is frequently, but not always, fatal to any restriction of speech.27 
applies to state and local government through the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment also provides procedural protection to those who arc dis-
ciplined by public schools. 
Because of the state action requirement, neither the First Amendment nor the 
Fourteenth Amendment applies to private schools; however, the values reflected 
in these amendments-free exchange of ideas and fairness-should be taught in 
private schools as well , and there is no better way to teach such values than 
through example. 
24. See, e.g., Steven H. Shiffrin, Racist Speech, Outsider Jurisprudence, and the 
Meaning of America, 80 COR.'IELL L. REv. 43 (1994); Richard Delgado & Jean 
Stefancic, Hateful Speech, Louing Communities: Why Our Notion of "A Just Bal-
ance" Changes so Slowly, 82 CAl .. L. REv. 851 (1994); Charles R. Lawrence, If He 
Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Spei!ch on Campus, 1990 Th'"KF. L.J. 431 
(1990); Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Vic-
tim's Story, 87 1\.ilcH. L. RF.v. 2320 (1989). 
25. A regulation of speech is content-based if it regulates discussion of a certain topic, 
such as racial or sexual equality. A regulation is viewpoint-based if it prohibits 
dissemination of anti-equality sentiments while allowing pro-equality expression. 
The latter type of regulation is more offensive to First Amendment principles 
because it represents a governmental determination of the accepted view on a 
particular subject. 
26. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989)(holding a Texa& statute regulat-
ing flag burning unconstitutional I. 
27. See, e.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988) (stating that an ordinance prohib-
iting focused was picketing justified by the government's interest in protecting 
the well-being, tranquility and privacy of the home); Roberts v. United States 
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984Xholding that the government interest in gender 
equality trumps the First Amendment interest in expressive association); 
Chaplinksy v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (holding that the government 
interest in preserving the peace and protecting individuals from harm trumps the 
First Amendment interest in uttering "fighting words"). 
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The governmental interest in a policy prohibiting racial and sexual 
harassment in public schools is to assure equal educational opportuni-
ties for all students, regardless of race or gender, and to avoid injury 
to students. In another context, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized in 
Roberts v. United States Jaycees that a state's interest in eradicating 
discrimination against females was compelling.2s Roberts addressed a 
First Amendment challenge, based on the right to expressive associa-
tion, to Minnesota's Human Rights Act, which prohibited sex discrimi-
nation in places of public accommodation, as applied to membership 
organizations such as the Jaycees. The state determined that sex dis-
crimination by such organizations imposes barriers to female eco-
nomic advancement and political and social integration.29 Certainly 
barriers to an equal educational opportunity are as harmful as barri-
ers to such public accommodations. Therefore, a public school should 
be able to survive the first prong of the strict scrutiny standard.30 
A regulation restricting only speech or symbolic expression that in-
terferes with an equal educational opportunity is the least restrictive 
means of accomplishing the compelling government interest identified 
above.:n Thus, the regulation should be general, in the sense that it 
reach all harassment that interferes with an equal educational oppor-
tunity, so it is not subject to an argument that it is viewpoint-based 
and underinclusive.32 At the same time, the regulation should care-
fully define harassment so students are on notice of what constitutes 
prohibited activity and the regulation avoids a vagueness attack.33 
28. &e Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984). 
29. &e id. at 626. 
30. The government's interest in preserving equality in housing is sufficiently com-
pelling to justify the restrictions on freedom of expression found in 42 U.S.C. 
§ 3617, which prohibits the interference with one's enjoyment of housing through 
such expressive activity as a cross burning in front of a home. See, e.g., United 
States v. J .H.H., 22 F.3d 821, 826-28 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Hayward, 6 
F.3d 1241, 1249-51 (7th Cir. 1993). 
31. The "narrowly tailored" requirement assures that the means utilized to accom-
plish the compelling governmental obJective regulate no more speech than is nec-
essary to accomplish the objective. Even where there is a compelling 
governmental interest, a regulation will be struck down if it is not narrowly tai-
lored. See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of New York State Crime 
Victims Board, 502 U.S. 105 <1991). 
32. See R.A V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
33. "A law is unconstitutionally vague if a reasonable person cannot tell what speech 
is prohibited and what is permitted." CnEMF"RI:-ISKY, CossTITUTIONAL LAw Plu.'l· 
cu•LES AN'D PoLITICS 763 (1997). See, e.g., Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 
(1983) ("[T]he void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that n penal statute define the 
criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can unden;tand 
what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary 
and discriminatory enforcement"). 
A related concept is overbreadth. "A law is unconstitutionally overbroad if it 
regulates substantially more speech than the Constitution allows to be regulated 
and a person to whom the law constitutionally can be applied can argue that it 
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In defending a First Amendment attack on a regulation prohibiting 
harassment, schools might suggest a forum approach that takes into 
account the role of government as an educator.34 As a general matter, 
a public building does not automatically qualify as a public forum. 
The use of government-owned property may be restricted to preserve 
it for its intended purpose.35 For example, while a trial is in session, 
limitations can be placed on speech in the courtroom; while a class is 
in session, limitations can be placed on speech in the classroom. If a 
school is a non-public forum, then reasonable restrictions on speech 
will be upheld as long as they are not based on viewpoint.36 This ap-
proach gives greater deference to school officials and makes it much 
more likely that a regulation prohibiting harassment will be upheld. 
While it does not prevent school officials from addressing peer har-
assment of students, the First Amendment must be considered care-
fully when preparing a regulation designed to address harassment.37 
Private schools, even though not bound by the First Amendment, 
should promote the values embodied in the First Amendment because 
of the importance of a free exchange of ideas in an educational setting. 
With careful drafting and sensitivity to the competing concerns, 
schools should be able to address harassment problems without violat-
ing the First Amendment. 
A second constitutional issue affects public schools' approach to 
regulating harassment. In attempting to address peer harassment, 
public schools must not ignore the requirements of the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.38 
would be unconstitutional as applied to others." Cn"EMERI~>SKY, at 764-65. See, 
e.g., Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981). 
34. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983)(uphold-
ing statute which restricted access to both the inter-school mail system and 
teacher mailboxes); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972)(upholding 
an ordinance barring a demonstration near a school); see generally Sexual Har-
assment Guidance, supra note 4, at 12,045-46. 
The role of government as an educator has been recognized by the Court. See, 
e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); Bethel Sch. Dist. 
No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
35. See, e.g., United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990)(upholding a prohibition 
on the solicitation of contributions on postal premises); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 
828 (1976)(upholding regulations barring political activities on a military base). 
36. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992); 
Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983). 
37. See Sexual Harassment Guidance, supra note 4, at 12,045-46; see also Monteiro v. 
Tempe Union High Sch. Dist., 158 F.3d 1022, 1026-32 (9th Cir. 1998)(expressing 
first amendment concerns if the plaintiffs challenge to a required reading was 
successful); Saxe v. State College Area School Dist., 77 F. Supp. 2d 621 (M.D. Pa. 
1999){holding that a school policy is not a hate-speech code, but rather a prohibi-
tion of harassment, which has never been considered to be protected under the 
First Amendment). 
38. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution 
prohibits deprivations of life, liberty or property without due process. In Goss v. 
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Those students accused of harassing other students are entitled to 
procedural safeguards before being "convicted" of harassment. At a 
minimum, they should receive sufficient notice of the charges to en-
able them to prepare a defense and they should be given an opportu-
nity to be heard before an impartial tribunal, just like the process 
available to the student accused of striking another student.39 Pre-
sumably most schools already have disciplinary procedures in place 
and those procedures should be adequate to address charges of har-
assment. While peer harassment must be taken seriously, efforts to 
prevent it and address complaints of harassment must not ignore the 
constitutional rights of those accused of harassment. 
IV. REMEDIES FOR VICTIMS 
Wher e efforts at prevention are unsuccessful, parents and students 
may consider litigation and, for obvious reasons, they would prefer to 
litigate against schools and their officials rather than, or at least in 
addition to, the students engaged in harassment. Because the poten-
tial causes of action and remedies will differ depending on the type of 
school and nature of the harassment, this article will examine both 
public and private schools, as well as racial and sexual harassment 
within each type of school separately. Potential actions based on com-
mon law will be considered briefly in a separate section.•o 
A. Public Schools- Fed er al Claims 
1. Racial Harassment 
There are several federal laws, starting with the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,41 that prohibit race discrimi-
nation in public schools. The Supreme Court's seminal decision in 
Brown v. Board of Education42 made it clear that a public school 
would violate the equal protection clause, as well as federal statutes, 43 
if it excluded or subjected a student to different terms and conditions 
because of her race. Similarly, racial harassment directed at a stu-
Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), the Court held that students suspended from public 
high schools for up to ten days were entitled to procedural protection against 
unfair suspensions. Because the students bad a protected interest in educational 
benefits, they were entitled to notice of the charges against them and, if they 
denied them, an ClC]llanation of the evidence as wc11 as an opportunity to present 
their side of the story. 
39. See Goss v. Lopez, -419 U.S. 565 (1975). 
40. See infra section IV.C. 
41. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that 
"[n]o State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-
tion of the laws." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1. 
42. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
43. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 2000d (1994). 
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dent by a school administrator or teacher would clearly violate the 
law. Peer harassment based on race, although it can deprive a stu-
dent of an education, is more difficult to remedy because school offi-
cials are not directly responsible for the injury. Nevertheless, school 
officials have a duty to assure that all students have an equal opportu-
nity to learn, regardless of race. Thus, the question is whether public 
schools and their officials can be held liable when students are de-
prived of an equal educational opportunity by other students because 
of their race. 
a. Fourteenth Amendment-Equal Protection 
When a state or local government official engages in intentional,44 
invidious discrimination45 based on race, a violation of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment occurs unless a compel-
ling justification exists for such discrimination.46 Rarely, if ever, will 
government have a compelling justification for invidious race discrimi-
nation.47 Therefore, if plaintiffs show that public officials are respon-
sible for intentional, invidious race discrimination, plaintiffs should 
win. However, even assuming that the actions of the harassing stu-
dents are directed at the student victims because of their race, the 
crucial question is when should the schools and school officials be le-
gally responsible and liable, absent intentional, invidious discrimina-
tion by school officials. The answer may vary depending on the 
circumstances. 
A number of situations will help to demonstrate the issues: 
(1) A school principal expressly requests or encourages a group of 
students to harass, threaten and intimidate another group of stu-
dents, based on the race of the latter group; 
44. In Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), the Court held there must be proof 
of a discriminatory purpose in order to show a violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause. A year later, in Village of Arlmgton Heights u. Metropolitan Housing 
Deu. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (19771, the Court discussed the different ways in which a 
discriminatory purpose could be shown. 
45. The term ~invidiousM is used here to distinguish the discrimination discussed 
here from racial classifications benefitting minorities. 
46. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 {1995); Rtchmond v. 
J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984); 
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
47. In Palmore u. Sidoti , 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984), the Court stated that "[c]lassiJ)ting 
persons according to their race is more likely to rt>flcct racial prejudiet> than legit· 
imatc public concerns." Ironically, the strict scrutiny !!tandard for race discrimi-
nation was fll'St a rticulated by the Court in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 
214 (1944), the case in which the Court upheld the constitutionality of the reloca· 
bon of Japanesc-Amertcans during World War IT. The outcome is probably ex-
plained by the Court's deference t{) the military, especially in times of war, and 
represents a rare example of invidious race discrimination surviving strict 
scrutiny. 
2000] PEER HARASSMENT 15 
(2) School officials, in a school without a policy addressing harass-
ment, do not actively request or encourage students to harass, 
threaten and intimidate other students based on race, but give the 
students a "license" to engage in such activity through the officials' 
own discriminatory actions and attitudes, which in some cases speak 
more clearly and loudly than express encouragement, and their failure 
to address or take seriously complaints of such activity; 
(3) School officials, in a school with a policy addressing harass-
ment, while not engaged in discriminatory actions affirmatively, fail 
to take complaints of harassment seriously and routinely fail to inves-
tigate such complaints or, even worse, find a reason to discipline the 
victims, but not the perpetrators; and 
(4) School officials, pursuant to a policy prohibiting peer harass-
ment and establishing a procedure for submitting complaints, 
promptly investigate the complaints, make findings and then take ap-
propriate disciplinary action against the perpetrators found in viola-
tion of the policy and also attempt to remedy the situation for the 
victim(s).48 
Obviously the school, along with its officials, is most likely to be 
held liable in the first situation and least likely to be held liable in the 
fourth situation. The liability of the school and its principal in the 
first example should be no different than if the principal himself had 
engaged in the racially motivated harassment. As a general matter, a 
government official cannot avoid liability for illegal discrimination by 
having someone else carry out the discriminatory activity.49 
The three remaining examples present more difficult situations be-
cause the causal connection between the injury to the victims and the 
school officials is less obvious. In the second example, school officials 
are aware from the complaints that the victims of harassment are be-
48. In addition to dealing with the perpetrnton; and ending the harassment, admmis-
trative remedies might include couru;cling for the victims and compcm~atory 
<'ducation. 
49. Where there is "joint participation" between government officials and private per-
sons, both can be held liable under constitutional and statutory provisions requir-
ing action under color of law. See, e.g., Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 
0982); Sullivan v. Barnett, 139 F.3d 158, 168-70 (3d Cir. 1998); Daviln-Lopes v. 
Zapata, 111 F.3d 192, 193 Clst Cir. 1997); Catanznno v. Wing, 103 F.3d 223, 228-
29 (2d Cir. 1996); Leeks v. Cunningham, 997 F.2d 1330, 1333 n.3 (11th Cir. 
1993); PheJp,., v, Dunn, 965 F.2d 93, 102 16th Cir. 1992>; Apostol v. Landau, 957 
F.2d 339, 343 <7th Cir. 1992). 
Supervisors can be held liable for the actions of subordinates when there il, an 
affirmative link between the challenged conduct and the action or inaction of the 
supervisor. See, e.g., Oona, R.-S.- by KateS. v. McCaffrey, 143 F.3d at 477; Spen-
cer v. Doe, 139 F.3d 107, 112 (2d Cir. 1998); Springdale Educ. Ass'n v. Springdale 
Sch. Dist., 133 F.3d 649, 653 (8th Cir. 1998); KauJ v. Stephan, 83 F.3d 1208, 1213 
n.3 (lOth Cir. 1996); John Doc v Hillsboro Indep. Sch. Dist., 81 F.3d 1395, 1402-
03 (5th Cir. 1996). 
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ing deprived of equal educational opportunities because of their race, 
but they allow the deprivation to continue. Such officials, through 
both their encouragement and their inaction, have engaged in inten-
tional discrimination based on race by depriving the victims of equal 
educational opportunities. A clear causal connection exists between 
the action/inaction of the school officials and the injury to the victims. 
Here the school officials' conduct constitutes the equivalent of that of 
law enforcement officials who, upon observing an African-American 
being beaten, decide to walk away without intervening because of the 
victim's race, thus depriving the victim of equal protection of the law 
enforcement agency.f>O Also, it resembles the employer that does noth-
ing after learning that, for example, a customer of the employer is 
harassing one of its employees. 51 
The third example closely resembles the second, except the school 
has a formal policy. However, because school officials ignore the for-
mal policy in practice, the situation differs little from the second. The 
same evil occurs: school officials are aware that students are being 
deprived of an equal educational opportunity because of race, but do 
nothing about it. Instead, they continue to operate a system that de-
prives students of equal opportunities because of their race. Such sys-
temic, intentional race discrimination violates equal protection.52 
In the fourth example, any liability imposed on the school or the 
school officials may appear to be in the nature of strict liability be-
cause there is no obvious indication of fault or causation. Here the 
argument against liability is strongest because the school adopted a 
policy prohibiting harassment and, as soon as school officials were 
50. Law enforcement officers have an affirmative duty to intervene to protect the 
constitutional rights of citizens from infringement by other officers. See, e.g., Ric-
ciuti v. NYC Transit Authority, 124 F.3d 123, 129 (2d Cir. 1997); Turner v. Scott, 
119 F.3d 425, 429-30 (6th Cir. 1997); Frazell v. Flanigan, 102 F.3d 877, 885-86 
(7th Cir. 1996); 1-lick v. Brewer, 76 F.3d 1127, 1136 (10th Cir. 19961; Hale v. 
Townley, 45 F.3d 914, 919 (5th Cir. 1995); Yang v. Hardin, 37 F.3d 282, 285 (7th 
Cir. 1994); United States v. Koon, 34 F.3d 1416, 1446-49 (9th Cir. 1994) rev'd on 
other grounds, 116 S. Ct. 2035 {1996). 
51. See, e.g., Lockard v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 162 F .3d 1062, 1072-75 (lOth Cir. 1998); 
Rodriguez-Hernandez v. Miranda-Velez, 132 F.3d 848, 854-55 (1st Cir. 1998); 
Crist v. Focus Homes, Inc., 122 F.3d 1107, 1111-12 (8th Cir. 1997 1; Folkel'!lon v. 
Circus Circus Enterprises, lnc., 107 F.3d 754, 756 (9th Cir. 1997). 
In a case alleging raCial harassment by elementary school students and claim-
ing a violation of equal protection and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the court held that school 
districts and school officials may be held liable upon a showing of deliberate indif-
ference to the harassment and such indifference can be shown from ~:~chool offi-
cials' actions or inaction in light of known circumstances. However, summary 
judgment for the defendants was appropriate because the record did not include 
sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find deliberate indifference. See Gant 
ex rel Gant v. Wallingford Bd. of Educ., 195 F.3d 134 (2nd Cir. 1999). 
52. See, e.g., Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189 (1973); Green v. 
County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
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made aware of harassment, they took appropriate action to address 
the harassment. However, prompt corrective action does not elimi-
nate the injury suffered by the victim. For example, assume the har-
assment was so traumatic that it caused serious health problems for 
the victim. Because schools have "a duty to provide a nondiscrimina-
tory environment that is conducive to learning," the victim in this ex-
ample may still be entitled to compensation for her injury. Similarly, 
if a school has a duty to protect students from harm caused by a third 
party, prompt corrective action will not eliminate liability for inju-
ries.53 One way to "reward" the school for adopting a policy and tak-
ing prompt corrective action would be to provide an affirmative 
defense if it could show that in fact all reasonable steps were taken to 
prevent the harassment.54 If the school successfully establishes the 
affirmative defense, the injured victim could still seek compensation 
from the students who caused the harm. 
Actions to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment are generally filed 
pursuant to a Reconstruction Era civil rights statute (42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983),Gii under which both individuals and municipalities can be 
held liable. However, entities can be liable under section 1983 only 
when the challenged conduct was taken pursuant to municipal pol-
icy.sa The policy does not have to be explicit.57 Officials who have 
53. See infra notes 193 and 234-38 and accompanymg text. In Oona R.S. ex rel Kate 
S. v. McCaffrey, 143 F.3d 473,477 <9th Cir. 1998), the court held Mthc duty to take 
reasonable steps to remedy a known hostile environment created by a peer is 
clearly established. Parents have long had a right to expect school officials to do 
what they reasonably can to protect the children who are temporarily in their 
custody and to provide an appropriate learning atmosphere." ld. 
54. Such a defense would be analogous to that created for employers in Burlington 
Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998). In Burlington Indus. the Court 
held: 
An employer tS subject to vicarious liability to a victimized employee for 
an actionable hostile environment created by a supervi~r with immedi-
ate (or successively higher) authority over the employee. When no tangi-
ble employment action is taken, a defending employer may raise an 
affirmative defense to liability or damages, subject to proof by a prepon-
derance of the evidence, see FED. R. Ctv. P. &c). The defense comprise:; 
two necessary elements: (a) that the employer exercised rca~nable care 
to prevent and correct promptly any sexually hara~ing behavior, and bl 
that the plaintiff-employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any 
preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to 
avoid harm otherwise. 
55. 42 u.s.c. § 1983 (1994). 
56. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978); see generally lvM E. 
BooENsTF.tNUt & ROSALIE BERGER LEVIl'SON, STATE & LocAL Gmr.RNMf'''''~' CtvtL 
RmnTS LtAnn.ITY §§ 1:06-07 (1987) [hereinafter Ctvn. RtctTTS LlABrLITY). 
57. See, e.g., City of Canton"· Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989) (stating that a municipal-
ity may be held liable for a failure to train or supervise where that failure consti-
tutes a deliberate indifference to the rights of persons who come into contact with 
its employees, and there is a causal connection between the injury and the munic-
ipality's failure); see generally CrviL RtCHTS LIABtWTY, supra note 56, at§ 1:07. 
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been delegated policymaking authority can bind the municipality by 
their conduct.os Thus, for example, the school official to whom the 
municipality delegates the responsibility for maintaining discipline 
and operating a school would generally be a person whose conduct is 
considered a "policy" for purposes of binding the school corporation. 59 
Therefore, victims of racial harassment must make high-ranking 
school officials- including board members, the superintendent, the 
principal, or the persons identified in the school harassment policy-
aware of the harassment. Such notice to school officials should be 
written, to reduce disputes about whether and when such officials re-
ally had notice. Even where the challenged action is not that of a poli-
cymaker, where a school corporation shows deliberate indifference to 
the rights of the students-by its failure to train employees, to disci-
pline those who ignore their duties or to correct a denial of equal edu-
cational opportunity-and that indifference is the cause of the victims' 
injury, the school corporation can be held liable under section 1983.60 
If a victim of peer harassment establishes liability under the equal 
protection clause and section 1983, she can obtain compensatory dam-
ages,61 equitable relief,62 costs, and attorney fees.63 In addition, if a 
student proves that school officials acted in reckless disregard of her 
federally protected rights, the jury may award punitive damages, at 
58. See, e.g., C1v1L RIGHTS LrAnn ITY, supra note 56, at § 1:06; Pembaur v. City of 
Cincinnati, 4 75 U.S. 469 ( 1986). It is important to consult state law to determine 
whether a particular policymaker has in fact been delegated final dccisionmaking 
authority. 
59. Identifying this school official will require a close review of slate law. See, e.g., 
Duda v. Franklin Park Pub. Sch. Dist. 84, 133 F .3d 1054, 1061 (7th Cir. 1998); 
Springdale Educ. Ass'n v. Springdale Sch. Disl., 133 F.3d 649, 652 (8th Cir. 
1998l; Eugene v. Alief Indep. Scb. Dist., 65 F.3d 1299, 1304-05 (5th Cir. 1995); 
Baxter ex rel Baxter v. Vigo County Sch. Corp., 26 F.3d 728, 735-36 (7th Cir. 
1994); Cornfield by Lewis v. Consolidated High Sch. Dist. No. 230,991 F .2d 1316, 
1325 (7th Cir. 1993); Adkins v. Board of Educ., 982 F.2d 952, 958-59 (6th Cir. 
1993); Partee v. Metropolitan Sch. Dist., 954 F.2d 454, 456 (7th Cir. 1992); Hull v. 
Cuyahoga Valley Bd. of Educ., 926 F.2d 505, 515-16 (6th Cir. 1991). 
60. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989). Several cases recognize that 
Harris applies in the school setting, but demonstrate Lhe difficulty of proof. See, 
e.g., Doe v. Hillsboro Indep. Sch. Dist. 113 F .3d 1412, 1416 (5th Cir. 1997); Kin-
man v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 94 F.3d 463, 467 (8th Cir. 1996); Thelma D. ex rel 
Delores A. v. Board of Educ., 934 F.2d 929, 934-35 (8th Cir. 1991). 
61. See Memphis Community Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299 (1986); Carey v. 
Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978); see generally CIVIL RJCIITS LrABTLITY, supra note 56, 
at§ 1:47. 
62. The statute (42 U.S.C. § 1983 (19941] specifically provides the injured party with 
a "1mit in equity." See generally CIViL RIGHTS LrAnrLITY, supra, note 56, at§ 1:53. 
63. A 1976 amendment to the civil rights statutes provrdcs that the court ''may allow 
the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney's fcc as a part of the cost." 42 
U.S.C. § 1988 (1994). See generally Crvn. RrGHTS LIABILITY, supra note 56, at 
§§ 1:57 - 1:64. 
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least against the officials in their individual capacity.64 While school 
officials can raise qualified immunity from damages as an affirmative 
defense,65 this should fail in most cases because intentional discrimi-
nation based on race is clearly unconstitutional. 
b. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
This statute66 generally prohibits race discrimination by recipients 
of federal financial assistance. Many elementary and secondary pub-
lic schools, as well as many private schools, receive such assistance.67 
The DOE, through the OCR, has the authority and obligation to en-
force Title VI in relation to educational institutions. sa Victims can file 
discrimination complaints with the OCR69 and, if it finds a violation, 
it can attempt conciliation7o and ultimately initiate proceedings to 
64. See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983); see generally C1vr1. RIGHTS LIABILITY, 
supra note 56, at § 1:50. Generally, municipalities are not liable for punitive 
damages. See City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981). 
65. Government officials have available a qualified immunity from damages awarded 
against them in their individual capacity where the right relied upon by the 
plaintiff was not "clearly established" at the time of the challenged conduct. 
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); see generally CIVIL RIGHTS LIAnn, 
lTV, supra note 56, at § 1:40-1:41. 
66. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994). The specific prohibition on discrimination reads as fol-
lows: "No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or na-
tional origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be 
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal fi-
nancial assistance." ld. 
67. In its "Budget Homepage," the United States Department of Education states: 
The anti-poverty and civil rights laws of the 1960s and 1970s brought 
about a dramatic emergence of the Department's equal access mission. 
The passage of (Title VI, Title IX and § 504] which prohibited discrimi-
nation based on race, sex, and disability, respectively, made Civil rights 
enforcement a fundamental and long-lasting focus of the Department of 
Education. In 1965, tbe Elementary and Secondary Education Act 
launched a comprehensive set of programs, including the Title I program 
of Federal aid to disadvantaged children to address the problems of poor 
urban and rural areas. And in that same year, the Higher Education Act 
authorized assistance for postsecondary education, including financial 
aid programs for needy college students. 
In 1980, Congress established the Department of Education as a Cab-
inet level agency. Today, ED operates some 175 programs that touch on 
every area and level of education. The Department's elementary and 
secondary programs annually serve 15,000 school districts and more 
than 50 million students attending over 85,000 public schools and more 
than 26,000 private schools. Department programs also provide grant, 
loan, and work-study assistance to nearly 8 million postsecondary 
students. 
The Federal Role in Education (visited April 7, 1999) <http://www.ed.gov/officesl 
OUS/fedrole.html>. 
68. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1994); 34 C.F.R. § 100.1-100.13 0999). 
69. See 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(bX1999). 
70. See 34 C.F.R. § 100.7{dX1999). 
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terminate the federal funds.n If a victim of discrimination considers 
litigation, they are not required to exhaust this administrative 
remedy.72 
A private right of action exists to enforce Title VI in court73 and the 
implementing regulations adopted by the DOE are entitled to defer-
ence in interpreting the statute.74 At least some Supreme Court jus-
tices believe DOE regulations themselves may be enforced against 
public schools through section 1983.75 The scope of the protection pro-
vided by Title VI is generally the same as the protection provided by 
the equal protection clause, requiring the plaintiff to prove intentional 
discrimination.76 However, neutral practices with a disparate impact 
can be addressed if a Title VI regulation that reaches disparate impact 
applies. 77 In most situations it is not necessary to rely on disparate 
impact because a school's failure to protect students from racial har-
assment by other students is intentional. Assuming this is correct, 
then in most cases against public schools the relief available under 
Title VI will be similar to the relief available under section 1983 in an 
action to enforce the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. However, there are some potentially significant differ-
ences, depending on the situation. 
First, the relief available under section 1983 may be better for 
plaintiffs because it provides for both compensatory and punitive dam-
71. See 34 C.F.R. § 100.8 (1999). 
72. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 706-08 n.41 (1979) (stating in 
dicta that exhaustion of administrative remedies was not necessary under Title 
IX); Neighborhood Action Coalition v. Canton, 882 F.2d 1012, 1015 (6th Cir. 
1989)(relying on Canrwn, the court held that Title VI plaintiffs do not have to 
exhaust administrative remedies); Doe v. St. Joseph's Hospital, 788 F.2d 411, 426 
(7th Cir. 1986)(stating that there is no need to exhaust administrative remedies 
under Title VI); see geMrally CIVIL RIGHTS LIABILITY, supra note 56, at § 8:36. 
73. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979); CIVIL RIGHTS LIABIL-
ITY, supra note 56, at§ 8:32. 
74. See Monteiro v. Tempe Union High Sch. Dist., 158 F.3d 1022, 1033 (9th Cir. 
1998). 
75. See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 607 n.27 (1983). 
76. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 284-87 & 325 (1978). 
While five justices agreed to this in Bakke, four justices suggested it may be lim-
ited to affirmative action cases. /d. at 325. 
77. See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 607 n. 27 (1983). For 
example, 
recipients, in determining the types of services, financial aid, or other 
benefits, or facilities that will be provided under any such program ... 
may not ... utilize criteria or methods of administration which have the 
effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination because of their race, 
.. . or have the effect of defeating or substantially impairing accomplish-
ment of the objectives of the program as respect individuals of a particu-
lar race .... 
34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b)(2)(1999). 
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ages, while punitive damages are questionable under Title VI.78 Sec-
ond, it may be easier to hold the school corporation liable under Title 
VI because of the need to show a "policy" under section 1983.79 Third, 
some courts limit liability for violations of Title VI to the recipient of 
federal financial assistance, usually an entity such as a school corpo-
ration.so Based on these rulings, individual school officials cannot be 
held liable under Title VI, although it is not clear why Title VI should 
be interpreted in such a limited manner, particularly where a school 
employee or official intentionally violates the prohibition against race 
discrimination.s1 Fourth, where the local school is an agency of the 
state, rather than an independent local entity, it may be insulated 
78. In Franklin 11. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 68-71 (1992), the Court 
confirmed the long-standing general rule that, absent clear direction to the con-
trary by Congress, where there is a cause of action under a federal statute the 
federal courts have the power to award any appropriate relief. Although the 
plaintiff's claim in Franklin was based on Title IX, the rationale applies to Title 
VJ as well. Despite the broad language in Franklin, some lower courts have been 
reluctant to allow punitive damages in claims based on the federal funding stat-
utes, such as Title VI. See, e.g., Moreno v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 99 F.3d 782, 
788-92 (6th Cir. 1996)(punitive damages not available under § 504); Doe v. 
Londonderry Sch. Dist., 970 F. Supp. 64, 76 (D.N.H . 1997)(punitive damages are 
not available against municipalities, including public school districts, under Title 
D{); Collier ex rel Collier v. William Penn Sch. Dist., 956 F. Supp. 1209, 1217 
(E.D. Pa. 1997) (same). But see, e.g., Pandazides v. Virginia Bd. ofEduc., 13 F.3d 
823, 829-32 (4th Cir. 1994)(punitive damages available under§ 504); Doe v. Oys-
ter River Cooperative Sch. Dist., 992 F. Supp. 467, 482 (D.N.II. 1997)(punitive 
damages available to private litigants under Title IX); Hernandez v. City of Hart-
ford, 959 F . Supp. 125, 133-34 (D. Conn. 1997)(punitive damages available under 
§ 504); Kilroy v. Husson College, 959 F. Supp. 22, 24-25 (D. Me. 1997) (same); 
DeLco v. City of Stamford, 919 F . Supp. 70, 72-74 (D. Conn 1995)(same). 
79. See discussion of the section 1983 "policy" requirement, supra notes 56- 60 and 
accompanying text. While cases generally hold that the federal funding statutes 
impose liability on the recipient of the federal financial assistance, the circum-
stances under which a school corporation can be held liable under Title IX for the 
actions of its teachers are discussed in Gehser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 
U.S. 274 (1998); see infra text accompanying notes 142-145. 
80. See Floyd v. Waiters, 133 F.3d 786, 789-90 (11th Cir. 1998)(discussing Title IX, 
but not Title VI); Smith v. Metropolitan Sch. Dist. Perry Township, 128 F.3d 
1014, 1018-21 (7th Cir. 1997Xsame); Buchanan v. City of Bolivar, 99 F.3d 1352, 
1356 (6th Cir. 1996); Nelson v. Temple Univ., 920 F. Supp. 633, 638 (E.D. Pa. 
19961; Clay v. Board of Trustees, 905 F. Supp. 1488, 1495 (D. Kan. 1995); Bowers 
v. Baylor Univ., 862 F. Supp. 142, 145-46 (W.D. Tex. 1994). But see Mennone v. 
Gordon, 889 F. Supp. 53, 56 (D. Conn. 1995)(finding a cause of action under Title 
IX). 
81. In Smith 11. Metropolitan Sch. Dist. Perry Township, 128 F.3d 1014, 1020-21 (7th 
Cir. 1997), the court suggested that school officials may be liable under Title IX in 
their official capacity even though they cannot be held liable in their individual 
capacity. According to the court, official capacity liability will tum on state law 
because of the need to identify the public authority with administrative control 
over the school. However, the court also recognizes that an official capacity suit 
against an officer is generally considered an action against the entity. See id. at 
1021 n.3. 
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from liability for damages by the Eleventh Amendment in a section 
1983 action,82 whereas Congress has abrogated the Eleventh Amend-
ment in actions under Title VI.B3 Fifth, a potential advantage of Title 
VI lies in the availability of an administrative remedy through the 
OCR in the DOE. Aggrieved persons may submit a complaintB4 to the 
OCR, which has an obligation to conduct an investigations;; and, if it 
fmds noncompliance, seek to resolve the complaint through either in-
formal means86 or the withholding of federal funds.s7 As stated, ex-
haustion of these administrative remedies is not required before 
initiating litigation under Title VI.SS 
In 1994 the DOE issued an Investigative Guidance outlining "pro-
cedures and analysis that OCR staff will follow when investigating 
issues of racial incidents and harassment against students at educa-
tional institutions."89 At least one court relied on the Investigative 
Guidance, giving it substantial deference and holding that a hostile 
racial educational environment created by student-student harass-
ment is actionable under Title VI.90 The Investigative Guidance spe-
cifically addresses a hostile environment and how it should be 
analyzed under Title VI: 
A violation of Title VI may also be found if a recipient has created or is 
responsible for a racially hostile environment-i.e., harassing conduct {e.g., 
physical, verbal, graphic, or written) that is sufficiently severe, pervasive or 
persistent so as to interfere with or limit the ability of an individual to part1ci-
82. Neither states nor state agencies arc "persons" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 1989). The Elev-
enth Amendment to the United States Constitution generally precludes a federal 
court from awarding damages against the state treasury; however, it does not 
prohibit prospective injunctive relief against state officials in their official capac-
ity. See CIVIL RIGHTS LIABILITY, supra note 56, at§ 1:44. "However, damages can 
be awarded against state officials in their individual capacity." ld. 
83. When passing legislation pursuant to its power conferred by section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, Congress has the power to abrogate Eleventh Amend-
ment protection. See CTVtL RIGHTS LIABILITY, supra note 56, at§ 1:46. Congress, 
in 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 (1994), abrogated Eleventh AmE-ndment immunity in ac-
tions brought under Title VI and Title IX. See also Litman v. George Mason, 186 
F.3d 544, 549-57 (4th Cir. 1999)(stating that in passing 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a )(l), 
Congress permissibly conditioned receipt of Title IX funds on an unambiguous 
waiver of eleventh amendment immunity and the university, in accepting such 
funding, consented to suit in federal court); see generally CJvu. RrcHTS LIAAII.ITY, 
supra note 56, at § 8:28; Fuller v. Rayburn, 161 F.3d 516, 518 (8th Cir. 1998); 
Lesage v. Texas, 158 F .3d 213, 216-19 (5th Cir. 1998), rev'd on other grounds, 120 
S. Ct. 467 (1999). 
84. See 34 C.F.R. § 100. 7(b){1999). 
85. See 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(c){1999). 
86. See 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(d)(1999). 
87. See 34 C.F.R. § 100.8-100.11 {1999). 
88. See supra note 72. 
89. Racial Harassment Guidance, supra note 3, at 11,448. 
90. See Monteiro v. Tempe Union High Sch. Dist., 158 F.3d 1022, 1033 {9th Cir. 
1998). 
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pate in or benefit from the services, activiti£>1:1 or privileges provided by a rectp-
ient. A I'I'Cipient has subjected an individual to different treatment on the 
basis of race if it has effectively caused, encouraged, accepted. tolerated or 
failro to corr('Cl a racially hostile environment of which it has actual or con-
:~tructive notict' (a~:~ discussed below). 
Under this analysis, an alleged harasser need not be an agent or employee 
of the rec1pient, because this theory of liabiltty under Title VI ts premised on a 
rectpient\ general duty to provide a nondiscriminatory educatumal 
ennronment 
To <>stablish a violation of Title VI under the hostile environment theory, 
OCR must find that: (1) A ractally hostile enVlronment existed: (2) the recipi-
ent had actual or constructive notice of the racially hostile environment; and 
!3) the recipient failed to respond adequately to redress the racially hosltle 
<>nvironment. Whether conduct constitutes a hostile envtronment must 1M> de-
termined from the totality of the circumstances, with particular attention paid 
to the factors discus:.ed below.91 
23 
The "factors discussed below" are (i) the "severe, pervasive or persis-
tent standard," (ii) whether school officials had notice, actual or con-
structive, of the hostile environment, and (iii) the recipient's response 
after receipt of notice.92 
As stated in the portion of the Investigative Guidance quoted 
above, "this theory of liability under Title VI is premised on a recipi-
ent's general duty to provide a nondiscriminatory educational environ-
ment." Once this duty is understood, then school district liability for a 
breach of the duty flows naturally. Such a duty is consistent with the 
requirements and purpose of Title VI, as well as the duty imposed on 
school corporations by state law.93 Title VI provides that no person 
shall "be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or 
be subjected to discrimination" based on race by any program receiv-
ing federal financial assistance. In interpreting this language, the 
DOE states: 
Ractally ba~ conduct that has such an effect. and that consists of differ-
ent treatment of students on the basis of race by I'I'Cipients' agents or employ-
ees, acting within the scope of their official duties, violates Title VI. In 
addition, the existence of a racially hostile environment that is created, en-
couraged, accepted, tolerated or left uncorrected by a recipicnlal~o constitutes 
different treatment on the bMis of race m violation of Title VJ.94 
Under this interpretation of Title VI, situations one through three95 
are clearly covered by Title VI. If Title VI means anything, it must 
reach schools that tolerate the deprivation of an equal educational op-
portunity based on race. Once a school has notice of a racially hostile 
environment, the failure to take corrective action constitutes encour-
agement, acceptance, and toleration of a discriminatory environment. 
91. Racial Harassrrumt Guidance, supra note 3, at 11,449 (emphasis added ). 
92. Id. at 11,449-11,450. 
93. See infra section IV.C. 
94. Rac1al Harassment Guidance, supra note 3, at 11,448. 
95. See supra text accompanying note 48. 
24 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79:1 
Situation four96 may be covered too, if school officials were aware of 
the deprivation of an equal educational opportunity before receipt of a 
complaint, or took no affirmative steps to assure an equal educational 
opportunity. In other words, the Investigative Guidance would sup-
port school liability when racial harassment by other students de-
prives a student of an equal educational, even absent a complaint from 
the victim. As a condition of receiving federal financial assistance, a 
school corporation gives the DOE "an assurance that the program will 
be conducted ... in compliance with all requirements imposed by or 
pursuant to this part."97 This imposes an affirmative obligation to 
provide an equal opportunity. 
Notice to a school can be either actual or constructive, according to 
the Investigative Guidance.98 Even where someone employed by the 
school has actual notice of a racially hostile environment, a question 
may still be raised about the sufficiency of the notice. For example, 
does notice to a janitor, cook, coach, secretary, social worker, nurse, or 
teacher suffice to impose a duty to act on the school corporation? The 
answer should be yes, because the school corporation can impose on 
any of its employees a duty to report to the principal or superinten-
dent, or some other designated official. To a student, several of the 
employees listed, particularly teachers, represent the school. It would 
therefore be reasonable for a student to assume she could report har-
assment to a teacher and expect corrective action. Similarly, it would 
be reasonable for a student to assume she could report harassment to 
a social worker or nurse, both of whom are professionals whose duties 
relate to the well-being of students. 
Students may find reporting harassment difficult and embarrass-
ing, and principals are not always the school employee most accessible 
to students. Therefore, to encourage reporting by students and to 
fully recognize the affirmative obligation of recipients offederal funds 
to make available an equal educational opportunity, actual notice to 
any school employee should reasonably be treated as actual notice to 
the school corporation. Of course, a school may encourage reporting to 
particular individuals through its policy, but a failure to report to one 
of the preferred individuals should not relieve the school corporation 
of liability. 
Under the Investigative Guidance, constructive notice is sufficient 
to trigger a school's duty to take corrective action. It provides that "[a) 
recipient is charged with constructive notice of a hostile environment 
if, upon reasonably diligent inquiry in the exercise of reasonable care, 
96. See id. 
97. 34 C.F.R. § 100.4(a)(l999). 
98. See Racwl Harassment Guidance, supra note 3, at 11,450. See infra note 191 and 
accompanying text regarding the n~ for actual notice and to whom it must be 
given. 
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it should have known of the discrimination."99 This too flows natu-
rally from the affirmative obligation of a recipient of federal financial 
assistance to ensure all students, regardless of race, an equal educa-
tional opportunity. 
Another factor to be considered under the Investigative Guidance is 
the recipient's response. "Once a recipient has notice of a racially hos-
tile environment, the recipient has a legal duty to take reasonable 
steps to eliminate it."lOO The appropriateness of the response will be 
evaluated "by examining reasonableness, timeliness, and effective-
ness."tot An appropriate response, according to the Investigative Gui-
dance, will result in a finding of no violation.1o2 This means the OCR, 
for purposes of administrative enforcement,l03 will not impose strict 
liability on the recipient of federal financial assistance, i.e., a school 
will not be held responsible for injury incurred before it had notice of 
the hostile environment and an opportunity to take corrective action. 
Such a rule may be reasonable where students cause the hostile envi-
ronment, rather than a school employee, such as a teacher. However, 
where a school employee causes the hostile environment, the school 
should be liable for any injury incurred despite prompt corrective ac-
tion, for the same reason that notice to any school employee should be 
sufficient. This resembles respondeat superior liability.t04 The "ap-
propriate response" defense should be treated as an affirmative de-
fense, with the burden of pleading and proof on the school 
corporation.tos 
One objection to school liability for a hostile environment is the 
difficulty in distinguishing between actionable harassment and "nor-
mal" or "typical" student behavior, including teasing. The Investiga-
tive Guidance addresses this concern, indicating that "[t]o determine 
whether a racially hostile environment exists, it must be determined if 
the racial harassment is severe, pervasive or persistent."t06 Referring 
99. Racial Harassment Guidance, supra note 3, at 11,450; see infra note 191 and ac-
companying text regarding the need for actual notice and to whom it must be 
given. 
100. Racial Harassment Guidance supra note 3, at 11,450. 
101. ld. at 11,450. 
102. See id. at 11,451. 
103. Limttations on enforcement through the administrative process, where the ulti-
mate remedy is withholding of federal financial assistance, should not be applied 
to the employed judicial remedy. See infra text accompanying notes 145-48. 
104. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 805-09 (1998); Burlington In-
dus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 759-65 (1998). 
105. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 763-65 (1998Xstating that an 
employer's exercise of reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexu-
ally harassing behavior is part of the affirmative defense available in defending a 
Title VII sexual harassment case when no tangible employment action is taken). 
106. Racial Harassment Guidance, supra note 3, at 11,449. 
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to these factors in the Investigative Guidance, the court in Monteiro u. 
Tempe Union High School District stated: 
Whether a hostile educational environment exists ts a question of fact, de-
termined with reference to the totality of the circumstances, including the vic-
tim's race and age. Racial harassment creates a hostile environment if it is 
suffici<'ntly severe that it would int~rfere with the educational program of a 
reasonabl<> person of the same age and race as the victim.107 
This appears to draw the line between actionable racial harassment 
and other "typical" student behavior in a reasonable manner. The key 
factual inquiry is whether the challenged activity interferes with the 
educational program, i.e., deprives the victim of an equal educational 
opportunity based on race. If yes, then it violates Title VI. Courts 
have to make a similar determination in sexual harassment claims 
under Title VII, where the courts distinguish between actionable sex-
ual harassment and crude, boorish behavior that is inappropriate but 
not a violation of Title VII. 10s 
c. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) 
This statute provides that "(a]ll persons ... shall have the same 
right ... to make and enforce contracts ... and to the full and equal 
benefit of all laws ... as is enjoyed by white citizens .... "109 Section 
1981 reaches both private and government discrimination.JlO The 
word "contracts" has been interpreted broadly and includes, for exam-
ple, a private school's refusal to admit students because of their 
race. l ll Further, the term "make and enforce contracts" was defined 
in 1991 to include "the making, performance, modification, and termi-
nation of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, 
terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship."112 Therefore, 
since the 1991 amendment, section 1981 applies to racial harassment 
in employment, education and other contractual relationships.ua 
Students and school officials engaged in racially harassing conduct 
can be sued under section 1981. Municipal entities, such as the school 
corporation or district, are subject to suit under section 1981, but the 
107. Monteiro v. Tempe Union High Sch. Dist., 158 F.3d 1022, 1033 (9th Cir. 1998); 
see infra note 196 for a discussion of actionable sexual harassment. 
108. See CIVIL RronTs LlAllrLITY, supra note 56, at§ 5:18. 
109. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(aX1994). 
110. &e 42 U.S.C. § 1981(cX1994); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976); Jones v. 
Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968); see generally CJVTL RIGHTS LIABILITY, 
supra note 56, at § 3:07. 
111. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976); see generally Crvn. RIGHTS LrAiliL· 
lTV, supra note 56, at§ 3:11. 
112. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(bX1994). 
113. &e, e.g., Spriggs v. Diamond Auto Glass, 165 F.3d 1015, 1017-19 (4th Cir. 1999); 
Jackson v. Motel6 Multipurpose, Inc., 130 F.3d 999, 1008 (11th Cir. 1997); Reyn-
olds v. CSX Transp., Inc., 115 F.3d 860, 866-67 (11th Cir. 1997); Dennis v. County 
of Fairfax, 55 F.3d 151, 155 (4th Cir. 1995). 
2000] PEER HARASSMENT 27 
plaintiff must show that she was injured as the result of a "policy," 
either explicit or implicit.tl4 Also, as discussed in the context of sec-
tion 1983, the actions of a policymaker constitute the "policy" of a mu-
nicipal entity. 115 
At least in public schools,n6 the "full and equal benefit" clause di-
rectly addresses the student deprived of an equal educational opportu-
nity as a result of racial harassment by other students.l17 As 
discussed earlier, a student who must endure racial harassment in 
school does not enjoy "the full and equal benefit of all laws" because 
she is in an environment that interferes with her ability to leam.us 
While section 1981 is available to address a race-based denial of an 
equal educational opportunity, it does not necessarily add to the scope 
of coverage or relief available through section 1983 and Title VI. 
2. Sexual Harassment 
As with racial harassment, there are several federal laws, starting 
with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, that 
prohibit sex discrimination in public schools. At least since the Su-
preme Court's holding in Mississippi University for Women v. Ho-
gan, 119 it would violate the equal protection clause, as well as federal 
statutes, if a public school were to exclude or subject a student to dif-
ferent terms and conditions because of her gender. Similarly, sexual 
harassment directed at a student by a school administrator or teacher 
would violate the law. Peer harassment based on sex, although it can 
deprive a student of an education, is more difficult to remedy because 
school officials are not directly responsible for the injury. Neverthe-
less, school officials have a duty to assure that all students have an 
equal opportunity to learn, regardless of gender. Thus, the question 
again is whether public schools and their officials can be held liable 
when, because of their gender, students are deprived of an equal edu-
cational opportunity by other students. 
114. See Jett v. Dalla.c1 Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701 (1989); see generall.v CIVIL 
Rw1m; LIAJ11LITY, supra note 56, at § 3:08; Federation of African-American Con-
tracton~ v. City of Oakland, 96 F.3d 1204, 1209-1619th Cir. 1996); Randle v. City 
of Aurora, 69 F.3d 441, 446-50 ClOth Cir. 1995). 
115. See Civil, RIGHTS LIABILITY, supra note 56, at § 1:04. 
116. Some courts hold that the equal benefit clause requires state action. See, e.g., 
Jones v. Pomdexter, 903 F.2d 1006, 1010 (4th Cir. 1990); Pean-on v. Duck, 871 
F.2d 579, 581 (6th Ctr. 1989); Mahone v. Waddle, 564 1''.2d 1018, 1029-30 (3d Cir. 
1977). 
117. Although there has been relatively little litigation under the (.'(jUal benefit clause, 
see CIVIL RIGHTS LlABIWTY, supra note 56, at§ 3:14, the language of the statute 
clearly covers a denial of an equal educational opportunity. See, e.g., Gant ex rei. 
Gant v. Wallingford Bd of Educ., 195 F.3d 134 (2nd Cir. 1999). 
118. See supra text accompanying notes 3-14. 
119. 458 u.s. 718 (1982). 
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a. Fourteenth Amendment-Section 1983 
Just as racial harassment is race discrimination, so too sexual har-
assment is sex discrimination.12o Application of the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to sexual harassment in educa-
tion is essentially the same as applying it to racial harassment in edu-
cation. Although the Supreme Court applies strict scrutiny to race 
discrimination and intermediate scrutinyl21 to sex discrimination, 
this difference is not significant here because it is just as unlikely that 
a school could establish an important government interest (as re-
quired under intermediate scrutiny) to justify sexual harassment as it 
is that a school could establish a compelling government interest to 
justify racial harassment. In fact, it is inconceivable that a school 
would ever defend either type of case by arguing it has an interest in 
allowing harassment that interferes with an equal educational oppor-
tunity. Therefore, the issues related to using the equal protection 
clause to address sexual harassment are the same as when the equal 
protection clause is used to address racial harassment. 
Some courts have erroneously held that "a§ 1983 claim based on 
the Equal Protection Clause is subsumed by Title IX."l22 No evidence 
exists that Congress, in passing Title IX without an express private 
right of action, intended to eliminate a pre-existing equal protection 
claim based on section 1983. Courts concluding that Title IX elimi-
nates equal protection claims based on section 1983 rely on two Su-
preme Court decisions, Smith u. Robinsonl23 and Middlesex County 
Sewerage Authority u. National Sea Clamm.ers Association.I24 Na-
tional Sea Clamm.ers does not apply because it deals with a different 
issue - whether section 1983 can be utilized to enforce substantive 
rights provided by a federal statute where the substantive statute it-
self provides a comprehensive enforcement scheme.125 The analogous 
120. See, e.g., CIVIL RmnTS LIABIUTY, supra note 56, at§ 5:16 n.42; David v. City and 
County of Denver, 101 F.3d 1344 (lOth Cir. 1996); Nicks v. Missouri, 67 F.3d 699 
(8th Cir. 1995); Annis v. County Westchester, 36 F.3d 251 (2d Cir. 1994); Beards-
ley v. Webb, 30 F.3d 524 (4th Cir. 1994); Carrero v. New York City Housing Au-
thority, 890 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1989); Lipsett v. Univ. of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881 
(1st Cir. 1988); Bohen v. City of East Chicago, Ind., 799 F.2d 1180 (7th Cir. 1986). 
121. The intermediate scrutiny standard was first articulated in Craig v. Boren, 429 
U.S. 190 (1976), and, arguably, the level of scrutiny was heightened in United 
States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996). 
122. Bruneau v. South Kortright Cent. Sch. Dist., 163 F.3d 749, 757-59 (2d Cir. 1998), 
cert denied 119 S. Ct. 2020 (1999). The Second Circuit indicates it is joining the 
Third and Seventh Circuits, but recognizes that the Sixth, Eighth and Tenth Cir-
cuits have held that Title IX does not eliminate section 1983 actions to enforce 
the Equal Protection Clause. 
123. 468 u.s. 992 (1984). 
124. 453 u.s. 1 (1981). 
125. &e Natio11al Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 19-21; see also Wright v. City of Roanoke 
Redevelopment and Housing Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 427 (1987) (distinguishing Na· 
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· ue here would be whether section 1983 can be used to enforce Title 
IX and National Sea Clammers does not control even this issue be-
cause Title IX, unlike the substantive statute at issue there, does not 
address private enforcement actions.I26 
Smith is closer in that it at least addresses the same issue-
whether Congress can eliminate a section 1983 claim to enforce a con-
stitutional provision by incorporating those constitutional rights into 
another federal statute. In Smith, the Court held that the Individuals 
with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)127 provides the exclusive 
means of enforcing the equal protection rights of elementary and sec-
ondary school students.12s However, Smith, the only Supreme Court 
decision addressing this issue, was rendered meaningless when Con-
gress promptly amended the IDEA and indicated it did not intend to 
eliminate section 1983 actions to enforce equal protection rights.129 
Even though Congress cannot overrule a decision of the Court, and 
thus Smith remains as precedent, it does not support the conclusion 
reached in some Title IX cases because Title IX, unlike the IDEA, does 
not provide a comprehensive enforcement scheme.130 As noted ear-
lier, it does not even provide an express right of action. 
b. Title IX of Education Amendments of 1972 
Title IX generally prohibits sex discrimination by recipients of fed-
eral financial assistance.t31 Most elementary and secondary public 
schools, and many private schools, receive such assistance. The DOE 
has the authority and obligation to enforce Title IX against educa-
tional institutions receiving federal financial assistance.132 Victims 
can file discrimination complaints with the DOE OCR and, if it finds a 
violation, it can attempt conciliation and ultimately initiate proceed-
ings to terminate the federal funds.133 Such complaints will be ad-
tional Sea Clammers as a case where the statute itself provided for private judi-
cial remedies (thereby evidencing congressional intent to supplant the section 
1983 remedy)); see generally Ctvn. RIGHTS LIABILITY, supra note 56, at § 1:20. 
126. The private right of action under Title IX is implied. See Cannon v. University of 
Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979). 
127. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (1994). At the time Smith v. Robinson., 468 U.S. 1009 (1984), 
was decided, it was known as the Education for All Handicapped Children's Act. 
128. See Smith, 468 U.S. at 1009-13. 
129. See Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(0(1994). 
130. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (1994). 
131. The prohibition on sex discrimination reads as follows: "No person in the United 
States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the 
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or 
activity receiving Federal financial assistance, except . . . ." 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1681(a)(1994). 
132. See 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1994); 34 C.F.R. § 106.1 (1999). 
133. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.71 (1999), which adopts the enforcement provisions related to 
Title VI, 34 C.F.R. §§ 100.6-100.11 and 34 C.F.R. § 101. 
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dressed in accordance with the DOE Sexual Harassment Guidance 
issued March 13, 1997.l:l4 If a victim of discrimination is considering 
litigation, exhaustion of this administrative remedy is not required.l35 
A private right of action exists to enforce Title IX in cou.rtl36 and 
the implementing regulations adopted by the DOE are entitled to def-
erence in interpreting the statute.l37 At least some justices believe 
agency regulations themselves may be enforced against public schools 
through section 1983.138 The scope of the protection provided by Title 
IX is generally the same as that provided by the Equal Protection 
Clause, although it is not clear whether plaintiffs need to prove inten-
tional discrimination.l39 However, neutral practices with a disparate 
impact can be addressed if there is an applicable Title IX regulation 
that reaches disparate impact.140 
Several years after determining there was an implied private right 
of action to enforce Title IX, the Court concluded that Title IX author-
ized a high school student who had been sexually harassed by a 
teacher to recover damages from the school district.141 However, in 
Gebser u. Lago Vista buiepenent School District, 142 the Court substan-
tially limited the circumstances in which a school corporation can be 
held liable for injuries caused by a teacher who sexually harassed a 
student, beginning in her eighth grade. In short, the Gesber Court 
held that it "will not hold a school district liable in damages under 
Title IX for a teacher's sexual harassment of a student absent actual 
134. Sexual Harassment Guidance, supra note 4, at 12,033. 
135. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (19791; see generally ClVlL 
RIGHTS LrAniLITY, supra note 56, at § 8:36. 
136. See Cannon v. Univcn;ity of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979). As with Title VI, supra 
note 80, the recipient-entity, rather than offic1als of the entity, may be the only 
appropriate defendant. See, e.R., Soper ex rei. Soper v. Hoben, 195 F.3d 845 !6th 
Cir. 1999), Doc v. School Administrat•ve Dist. No. 19, 66 1''. Supp. 2d 57 CD. Me. 
1999), and Niles v. Nelson, 72 F. Supp. 2d 13 {~.D.N.Y. 1999), all suggesting 
there is no mdividual capacity liability for violations of Title IX. 
137. See 20 U.5~C. § 1682 (19941; compare Monteiro v. Tempe Union High Sch. Dist., 
158 F.3d 1022, 1033 (9th Cir. 1998Kreferring to Title VI, Racialllarassmeni Gui-
dance); with Doe v. University of m., 138 F.3d 653, 667 (7th Cir. 1998Xholding 
that Title IX Sexual Harassment Guidance is not entitled to strict deference, but 
"it merits our cons•deration"). Each federal agency providing federal financial 
assistance is authorized by Congrel):) to adopt regulations implementing Title IX. 
See 20 U.S.C. * 1682 (1994). 
138. See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582 '1983>; CIVIL Rmrm; 
LrAnn.TTY, supra note 56, at§ 8:23 
139. See, e.g., Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agriculture, 998 F.2d 824, 832-33 (10th 
Cir. 1993)(holding that intent not required to show a violation of Title DO; 
Chance v. Rictl Univ., 984 F.2d 151, 153 (5th Cir. 1993)(holding that a plaintiff 
could not establiHh a prmw facie case of disparate impact, even if that standard 
should be applied to her Title IX claim). 
140. See, e.g., 34 C.F.R. * 106.21-106.23 (1994). 
14 I. See Franklin v. Gwmnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60 (1992). 
142. 524 u.s. 274 (19981. 
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notice and deliberate indifference."t43 The "actual notice" must be to 
"an official of the recipient entity with authority to take corrective ac-
tion to end the discrimination."t44 
Even though the private right of action to enforce Title IX is im-
plied, the Court looked to the express administrative remedy found in 
Title IX, requiring notice to an appropriate person and an opportunity 
to rectify any violation, for guidance in fashioning the implied damage 
remedy. The Court held: 
It would be unsound, we think. for a statute's express system of enforce-
m<'nt to requ1re not1ce to the recipient and an opportunity to come into volun-
tary compliance while a judicially implied system of enforcement permits 
substantial liability without regard to the recipient's knowledge or its correc-
tive actions upon receiving notice.l45 
This logic appears unsound for several reasons. First, Congress views 
the express administrative remedy, withholding of federal financial 
assistance, as more drastic than the implied judicial remedy. Con-
gress overturned the Court's decision in Grove City College u. Befl146 
that limited coverage of the prohibition on discrimination to the spe-
cific program that receives federal funds, and expanded coverage to 
the entire institution based on funding received by only one program. 
But Congress continued to limit the administrative remedy-withhold-
ing federal funds-to the situation where the discrimination actually 
takes place in the program receiving the federal funds.147 Thus, if a 
university receives federal funds in its medical school, a victim of sex 
discrimination in the athletic department has an implied right of ac-
tion under Title IX, but the federal financial assistance to the medical 
school could not be terminated administratively based on the discrimi-
nation in the athletic department. The cutoff of federal financial as-
sistance is more drastic because the intended beneficiaries of the 
funding are deprived of the benefits of the federal funds.t48 In con-
trast, a more narrow damage judgment punishes the university, the 
wrongdoer, for violating the law without affecting, at least not di-
rectly, the beneficiaries of the federal fmancial assistance. 
143. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 292-93; see Willis v. Brown University, 184 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 
1999l; Doe v. School Administrative Dist. No. 19, 66 F . Supp. 2d 57 <D. Me. 1999); 
Turner v. McQuarter, 79 F. Supp. 2d 911 <N D. ni. 1999). 
144 Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290. 
145. ld. at 289-90 <emphasis in original). The "express means of enforcement" rc-
ferrt'd to by the Court is found at 20 U.S.C § 1682 and 34 C.F.R. §§ 100.7, 100.8 
a nd 106.3. 
146. 465 u.s. 555 (1984). 
14 7. Civil Rights Re~toration Act of 1987, 20 U.S.C. ~ 1687 (1994). The program speci-
ficity requirement for administrative enforcement of Title IX is found in 20 
U.S.C. § 1682 (1994). See C1VTL RIGHTS Lwm.JTY, supra note 56, at§ 8:14. 
148. The Court recognized this in Cannon v. University ofCiucago, 441 U.S. 677, 704-
06 (1979). 
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Second, the Court, in interpreting a law designed to end sex dis-
crimination in education, appears more concerned about the financial 
health of the offending institution than it is about compensating the 
victim of the illegal discrimination. This is evident from the majority's 
concern that "an award of damages in a particular case might well 
exceed a recipient's level of federal funding."I49 There is no basis for 
this concern. When an institution accepts federal funds explicitly con-
ditioned on its agreement150 to abide by the anti-discrimination provi-
sion and then proceeds to engage in discrimination that causes 
injuries in excess of the federal funding, the institution has breached 
its agreement with the federal government. It is not clear why the 
Court should be concerned about imposing liability beyond the 
amount of the federal funding. Compensatory damages are meant to 
make victims whole, and the amount awarded should be governed by 
the extent of the victim's injury, not the defendant's resources.151 At 
least since Cannon u. University of Chicago152 in 1979, educational 
institutions accepting federal financial assistance have been on notice 
that victims of discrimination have a private right of action. The 
unanimous decision in Franklin u. Gwinnet County Public School153 
in 1992, which simply confirms the 1946 holding in Bell u. Hoodi54 
that "all appropriate remedies" are available in court unless Congress 
expressly indicates otherwise, clearly placed such institutions on no-
tice that damages were available to victims of sex discrimination. If 
149. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290. In contrast, the Court in Cedar Rapids Communtty Sch. 
Dist. u. Garret F. , 526 U.S. 66 (1999), was much less concerned with the frnancial 
burden imposed upon the recipients of federal frnancial assistance pursuant to 
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-87 (1994). 
There the Court recognized that the school corporations "may have legitimate 
financial concerns, but our role in this dispute is to interpret existing law.~ 
Gebser, 524 U.S. at 77. 
150. A Department of Education regulation, 34 C.F.R. § 106.4(aX1999), reads as 
follows: 
Every application for Federal financial assistance for any education pro-
gram or activity shall as condition of its approval contain or be accompa-
nied by an assurance from the applicant or recipient, satisfactory to the 
Assistant Secretary, that each education program or act1vity operated by 
the applicant or recipient and to which this part applies will be operated 
in compliance with this part. An assurance of compliance with this part 
shall not be satisfactory to the Assistant Secretary if the applicant or 
recipient to whom such assurance applies fails to commit itself to take 
whatever remedial action is necessary in accordance with § 106.3(a) to 
eliminate existing discrimination on the basis of sex or to eliminate the 
effects of past discrimination whether occurring prior to or subsequent to 
the submission to the Assistant Secretary of such assurance. 
151. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254 (1978) (A defendant's resources may be 
relevant to an award of punitive damages, but not compensatory damages.); 
Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 36 n.5 (1983). 
152. 441 u.s. 677 (1979). 
153. 503 u.s. 60 (1992). 
154. 327 u.s. 678 (1946). 
2000] PEER HARASSMENT 33 
this was not apparent to schools from Bell, it certainly was after the 
1986 amendments abrogating Eleventh Amendment immunity.t55 
Upon close examination, Justice O'Connor's justifications for the 
limited liability rule adopted in Gebser and discussed above are not 
convincing. Once these stated justifications are exposed and under-
mined, it is apparent that they were simply a proxy for the Court's 
unwillingness to give student victims of sexual harassment the benefit 
of the normal rules of liability, agency, and relief. As pointed out by 
Justice Stevens in his dissent, which was joined by three other jus-
tices, "[a]s a matter of policy, the Court ranks protection of the school 
district's purse above the protection of immature high school students 
that [agency] rules would provide."15G 
The decision in Gebser is particularly perplexing in light of the 
Court's decisions a few days later in two Title VII cases involving sex-
ual harassment in employment.t57 There the Court was willing to im-
pose "vicarious liability to a victimized employee for an actionable 
hostile environment created by a supervisor \vith immediate (or suc-
cessively higher) authority over the employee."t58 Under Title VII, an 
affirmative defense is available to the employer when a supervisor's 
harassment does not culminate "in a tangible employment action, 
such as discharge, demotion, or undesirable reassignment."t59 How-
ever, where the harassment does culminate in "a tangible employment 
action," no affirmative defense is available to the employer.160 The 
affirmative defense "comprises two necessary elements: (a) that the 
employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly 
any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee 
unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective 
opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm other-
wise,"l61 and the employer bears the burden to establish the elements 
of the defense. 
Strict liability, without an available affirmative defense, is justi-
fied where there is "a tangible employment action" because "there is 
an assurance the injury could not have been inflicted absent the 
agency relation."162 This, the Court concludes, satisfies the "aided in 
accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation" require-
155. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 (1994). 
156. See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 306 (Stevens, J . dissenting). 
157. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. 
v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998). 
158. Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 765. 
159. ld. 
160. Id. 
161. ld. 
162. ld. at. 761-62. 
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ment of Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219(2)(d). tsa Such 
"[t]angible employment actions are the means by which the supervisor 
brings the official power of the enterprise to bear on subordinates."164 
In contrast, harassment by nonsupervisors triggers employer liability 
only where the employer "was negligent or reckless,"t65 and an em-
ployer is "negligent with respect to sexual harassment if it knew or 
should have known about the conduct and failed to stop it."166 
Justice Stevens, in his dissent in Gebser, argued for application of 
the standard found in Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219(2)(d):167 
"This case presents a paradigmatic example of a tort that was made 
possible, that was effected, and that was repeated over a prolonged 
period because of the powerful influence that [the teacher] had over 
[the student) by reason of the authority that his employer, the school 
district, had delegated to him."168 In fact, Justice Stevens correctly 
noted, "(a]s a secondary school teacher, [he] exercised even greater au-
thority and control over his students than employers and supervisors 
exercise over their employees."l69 Thus, vicarious liability should 
have been imposed on the school district. Because the affirmative de-
fense issue had not been presented in Gebser, Justice Stevens did not 
address it.I70 
In her dissent in Gebser, joined by two justices, Justice Ginsburg 
says she, "[i)n line with the tort law doctrine of avoidable conse-
quences, .. . would recognize as an affirmative defense to a Title IX 
charge of sexual harassment, an effective policy for reporting andre-
dressing such misconduct."t71 To take advantage of this defense, the 
school district would have "to show that its internal remedies were 
adequately publicized and likely would have provided redress without 
exposing the complainant to undue risk, effort, or expense."172 She 
concludes that a plaintiff who "unreasonably failed to avail herself of 
the school district's preventive and remedial measures, and conse-
quently suffered avoidable harm, ... would not qualify for Title IX 
relief."t73 Under the doctrine of avoidable consequences, to which 
Justice Ginsburg refers, a defendant does not avoid liability unless all 
harm was avoidable by the plaintiff. Normally that doctrine resem-
163. RRSTATE~u:r-."T (SECONJJ) OF AGE!IICY § 219(2)(d) (1957); see Burlington Indus., 524 
U.S. at 760-65. 
164. Burlington Indus. , 524 U.S. at 762 
165. RF-'\TATEMJ::.sT (SECONJJ) OF AGENCY, § 219(2)(b) (1957). 
166. Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 759. 
167. Rt:l>"TATE~!LNT (SF.CO!IID) o~· AnF.!IICY, § 219(2)(d) (1957). 
168. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 299 (Stevens, J. dissenting). 
169. ld. 
170. See id. at 304. 
171. ld. at 307 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting). 
172. Id. 
173. ld. 
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bles a mitigation requirement and simply reduces the amount of dam-
ages and allows compensation for the harm that could not be 
avoided.l74 As an affirmative defense, it places the burden of both 
pleading and proving the defense on the defendant. 
As demonstrated by the dissenting opinion of Justice Stevens, ap-
plication of Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219(2)(d) in Gebser 
would have led to a different result.t75 Justice O'Connor's attempt in 
Gebser to distinguish Title VII from Title IX-based on the fact that 
Title VII expressly provides for damages and the Title VII prohibition 
against discrimination in employment runs against an "employer," 
which is defined to include "any agent"176-is simply not convincing. 
First, the fact that Title VII provides an express right of action and 
Title IX an implied right of action, according to Franklin and Bell, is 
not relevant when it comes to the courts' power to impose liability or 
provide a remedy.t77 Second, the Court in Burlington Industries and 
Faragher did not rely on the definition of"employer" in Title VII as its 
basis for imposing vicarious liability on employers. Rather, it applied 
general agency law.t78 The same should be true under Title IX, as 
recognized by the Department of Education in its Sexual Harassment 
Guidance.l79 Application of agency law in Gebser, like that reflected 
in Restatement (Second) of Agency§ 219(2Xd), would lead to the same 
result reached in Burlmgton Industries and Faragher-the employer 
(school district) would have been held liable for the sexual harassment 
of one of its agents, the teacher, who "brings the official power of the 
enterprise to bear on subordinates"tso (students) just like a supervisor 
in the employment context. Justice Stevens correctly recognized that 
the teacher-student sexual harassment case presents an even stronger 
case for employer/institution liability than the supervisor-employee 
sexual harassment case because a teacher has greater authority and 
control over his students than a supervisor over subordinates. Fur-
thermore, the sexual abuse of the student-like the sexual abuse of an 
employee-"was made possible only by [the teacher's] affirmative mis-
use of his authority as her teacher."tSl 
174. See Burlington Indus .• Inc., 524 U.S. at 764; Lawson v. Trowbridge, 153 F.3d 368, 
376-78 (7th Cir. 1998>: Outboard Marine Corp. v. Babcock Indus., Inc., 106 F.3d 
182, 184-85 (7th Cir. 1997); RESTATOIF.NT (SEco.so) OF ToRTS § 918 (1977). 
175. See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 298-301. 
176. /d. at 280-84. 
177. See Franklin v. Gwinnet County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60,66-71 0992) (confrrming 
the long.-tanding general rult> that, absent clear direction to the contmry by Con-
gresR, where there is a cause of action under a federal statute, thC' federal courts 
have the powt>r to award any appropriate relieO. 
178. Burlington Indus., Inc., 524 U.S. at 760-65; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 801-09. 
179. Sexual Harassment Guidance, supra note 4, at 12,039-40. 
180. Burlwgton Indus .. Inc., 524 U.S. at 762. 
181. Geb~r. 524 U.S at 300. 
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About a year after deciding Gebser, the Court again addressed the 
scope of Title IX in determining whether a school district can be held 
liable for harm resulting from student-student harassment in elemen-
tary or secondary schools. In another 5-4 opinion, with the four dis-
senters in Gebser joining Justice O'Connor, the Court in Davis v. 
Monroe County Board of Education,l82 held that the plaintiff stated a 
claim for relief under Title IX. The court of appeals in Davisl83 af-
firmed a dismissal for failure to state a claim under Title IX ''because 
Congress gave no clear notice to schools and teachers that they, rather 
than society as a whole, would accept responsibility for remedying stu-
dent-student sexual harassment when they chose to accept federal fi-
nancial assistance under Title IX."l84 This holding rested on the 
court's conclusion that "an enactment under the Spending Clause 
must unambiguously disclose to would-be recipients all facts material 
to their decision to accept Title IX funding"l85 and Congress failed to 
provide such notice of potential liability for student-student harass-
ment in the language or history of the statute. Assuming the Court in 
Franklin recognized a Title IX cause of action for teacher-student sex-
ual harassment, but suggesting it was dicta, the Eleventh Circuit in 
Davis was unwilling to extend it to student-student sexual 
harassment.l86 
Dismissal of the claim in Davis for failure to state a claim is incon-
sistent with Franklin and Gebser, both of which recognized that sex-
ual harassment is a form of sex discrimination prohibited by Title IX. 
In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,l87 the Supreme Court's first sex-
ual harassment case, the Court recognized that sexual harassment, 
like racial harassment, is a form of discrimination because it consti-
tutes an arbitrary barrier to equality. A victim of racial or sexual har-
assment in the workplace is denied an equal employment opportunity 
because she is subjected to different terms and conditions of employ-
ment because of her race or sex.1ss Very simply, an employer with a 
racially or sexually hostile work environment says, "you can work 
here, but because of your race or sex you will have to tolerate abuse." 
Similarly, a school district in which teachers abuse students be-
cause of their race or sex is saying "you can attend school, but because 
of your race or sex you will have to tolerate abuse by your teachers." 
There can be little doubt that such abuse, directed at certain students 
182. 119 S. Ct. 1661 (1999). The four justices who joined O'Connor in Gebser- Rehn-
quist, Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas all dissented in Davis. 
183. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 120 F.3d 1390 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. 
granted, 119 S. Ct. 29 (1998). 
184. Davis, 120 F.3d at 1406. 
185. ld. 
186. See id. at 1400 n.14. 
187. 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
188. See id. at 66. 
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because of their race or sex, is a form of race or sex discrimination and 
deprives the victims of an equal educational opportunity. It is no dif-
ferent than a teacher saying to a student "because of your race or sex I 
will not provide you with the materials supplied to the other students 
in this class." Would the Eleventh Circuit say in the latter situation 
that a student deprived of class materials by her teacher, because of 
her sex, does not have a Title IX claim? Of course not. 
Assume that a teacher, instead of directly depriving a student of 
class materials because of her sex, tells a few of her male classmates 
to "steal" her materials after class and return them to the teacher. 
Presumably the same result-even in the Eleventh Circuit the victim 
could state a claim under Title IX. Now assume that the same teacher 
neither withholds the class materials from a student because of her 
sex, nor directs her classmates to deprive her of the materials, but 
instead knows the classmates are taking her materials and decides to 
do nothing about it.IS9 Clearly the victim is still being deprived of an 
equal educational opportunity and she should have a Title IX claim 
against the school district. In each of these examples, if we change the 
act that causes a denial of equal educational opportunity from a depri-
vation of class materials to sexual harassment, the result should be 
the same. The victim is still denied an equal educational opportunity 
because of her sex. 
The first example, where the teacher says to a student "because of 
your sex I will not provide you with the materials supplied to the other 
students in this class," is actually the Gebser situation if we convert 
the teacher's action to sexual harassment. Even Justice O'Connor 
would say the school district could be held liable for the action of the 
teacher who deprives a female student of class materials because of 
her sex, but only if"an official of the recipient entity with authority to 
take corrective action to end the discrimination"I90 had actual notice 
of the teacher's action and was deliberately indifferent to the discrimi-
nation. Thus, while Gebser suggests the lower court in Davis is wrong 
because sexual harassment of students is actionable under Title IX, 
Gebser creates another hurdle for the plaintiff-victim in Davis. Apply-
ing the Gebser standard for school district liability, the victim of stu-
dent-student harassment will have to show that a school official "with 
189. The Court in Dauis uses a similar example: 
Consider, for example, a case in which male students physically threaten 
their female peers every day, successfully preventing the female stu-
dents from using a particular school resource- an athletic field or a com-
puter lab, for instance. District administrators are well aware of the 
daily ritual, yet they deliberately ignore requests for aid from the female 
students wishing to use the resource. 
119 S. Ct. at 1675. 
190. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290. 
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authority to take corrective action and to end the discrimination" 191 
had actual notice of the student-student harassment and was deliber-
ately indifferent to the discrimination. Presumably school officials 
such as teachers and counselors have authority to deal with student-
student harassment, just like they have authority to deal with a situa-
tion where one student assaults another, and therefore their knowl-
edge would be sufficient to render the school corporation liable. 
In Davis, the Court answered some of the questions relating to stu-
dent-student harassment. First, it held that at least "in certain lim-
ited circumstances," a school district's "deliberate indifference to 
known acts of harassment ... amounts to an intentional violation of 
Title IX, capable of supporting a private damages action."t92 Here, 
the Court noted that both the Title IX regulatory scheme and the com-
mon law placed schools on notice that they may be liable for their fail-
ure to respond to the discriminatory acts of third parties.19a However, 
the Court was quick to note the limits on a school district's liability. A 
recipient of federal funds can be held liable only where it "exercises 
substantial control over both the harasser and the context in which 
the known harassment occurs."I94 Further, Justice O'Connor stressed 
that the deliberate indifference standard adequately protects school 
administrators because they "must merely respond to known peer har-
assment in a manner that is not clearly unreasonable."t95 
Second, the Court emphasized the meaning of"discrimination" and 
the fact that harassment is a form of discrimination. Therefore, recip-
ients are "liable in damages [under Title IX) only where they are delib-
erately indifferent to sexual harassment, of which they have actual 
knowledge, that is so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that 
it can be said to deprive the victims of access to the educational oppor-
tunities or benefits provided by the school."l96 While physical exclu-
191. ld. '"Because officials' roles vary among school districts, deciding who exercises 
substantial control for the purposes of Title IX liability is necessarily a fact-based 
inquiry." Murrell v. School Dist. No. 1, 186 F.3d 1238, 1247 (lOth Cir. 1999). 
Where school officials did not have knowledge of the harassment until after the 
fact, and promptly acted to correct the situation after learning of it, the defend-
ants were not liable under Title IX. Soper ex rei. Soper v. Hoben, 195 F.3d 845, 
855 (6th Cir. 1999); see also Wills v. Brown University, 184 F.3d 20, 25-27 {1st 
Cir. 1999). 
192. Davis, 119 S. Ct. at 1671. 
193. See id. at 1671-72. 
194. /d. at 1672. For example, in Davis most of the harassment took place in the 
classroom. 
195. Id. at 1674. 
196. /d. at 1675. The Court did not specify which school officials have to have actual 
notice, however, the Gebser standard, one with .. authority to take corrective ac-
tion and to end the discrimination," suggests a wide range of school officials 
would satiRfy the requirement because most officialR have the authority to take 
corrective action against students. 524 U.S. at 290, see supra note 191. 
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sion from educational opportunities is not necessary, victim-students 
must show they "are effectively denied equal access to an institution's 
resources and opportunities."l97 To address the concerns of the dis-
senting justices, the majority was careful to point out that "simple acts 
of teasing and name-calling among school children" will not support 
private damage actions because they will be limited to "cases having a 
ystemic effect on educational programs or activities .... "198 It is 
unlikely, but not impossible, that a single instance of peer harassment 
will be sufficiently severe to meet the standard.l99 
The Court in Davis properly viewed student-student sexual har-
assment as a denial of or interference with an equal educational op-
portunity, rather than simply "sexual harassment." Obviously, the 
same is true of racial harassment. School districts are on notice that 
Title VI and Title IX require them to provide an equal educational 
opportunity to all children, regardless of race or sex. Public schools 
have been on notice of this general obligation at least since Brown200 
(race) in 1954 and Hogan201 (sex) in 1982. They have had more spe-
cific notice at least since DOE issued its Investigative Guidance re-
garding racial harassment202 in 1994 and its guidance regarding 
sexual harassment203 in 1997. Similarly, the assurances required by 
the DOE of all recipients of federal funds give clear notice that all 
students are entitled to an equal educational opportunity, regardless 
of race or gender.204 
In the third example above - where the teacher neither withholds 
the class materials from a student because of her sex, nor directs her 
classmates to deprive her of the materials, but instead knows the 
classmates are taking her materials and decides to do nothing about it 
- the question is whether the school district can be held liable under 
Where the plaintiff alleged that over the course of a month a lugh school stu-
dent repeatedly took her "to a secluded area and battered, undressed, and ~:;exu­
ally assaulted her" the wrongdoing was "sufficiently severe, pervasive and 
objectively offensive" to stat.e a claim. Murrell v. School Oist. No. 1, 186 F.3d 
1238, 1248 (lOth Cir. 1999); see Soper ex rei. Soper v. Hoben, 195 F.3d 845, 854-55 
(6th Cir. 1999). 
197. Dauis, 119 S. Ct. at 1675. 
198. ld. at 1675-76. In Dauis, the drop in the v1ctim's grades "provides necessary evi-
dence of a potential link between her education and [the harassment! ," but her 
ability to state a claim "depends equally on the alleged persistence and severity of 
[the harassment], not to mention the Board's alleged knowledge and deliberate 
indifference." ld. at 1676. 
199. See id. at 1676. But M!l! Doe v. School Admin. Dist. No. 19, 66 F. Supp. 2d 57, 62 
(D. Me. 1999) (MLAl student's claim of hostile environment [under Title 1X1 can 
arise from a single incident"). 
200. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
201. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982). 
202. Racial Harassment Guidance, supra note 3. 
203. Sexual Harassment Guidance, supra note 4. 
204. See 34 C.F.R. § 100.4 11999)(race); 34 C.F.R. § 106.4 (1999)(sex). 
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Title IX for the action, or inaction, of the teacher. For several reasons, 
the argument for liability here is stronger than in Gebser. Based on 
the agency principles discussed in Burlington Industries, this example 
presents a good case for school district liability under Restatement 
(Second) of Agency § 219(1): "[a] master is subject to liability for the 
torts of his servants committed while acting in the scope of their em-
ployment."20n AP. recognized by the Court in Burlington Industries, an 
employer "may be liable for both negligent and intentional torts com-
mitted by an employee within the scope of his or her employment."206 
While the Court was quick to conclude that, as a general rule, "sexual 
harassment by a supervisor is not conduct within the scope of employ-
ment,"207 a teacher's failure to correct an obvious denial of an equal 
educational opportunity certainly falls within the scope of his employ-
ment. In fact, the core job of a teacher is to provide equal opportuni-
ties to all children. Elimination of the personal motive, present when 
a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate or a teacher sexually ha-
rasses a student, facilitates a finding of action within the scope of em-
ployment here. 
Even if it is determined that this teacher did not act within the 
scope of his employment, Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219(2) 
provides a basis for school district liability. 
(2) A master is not subJect to liability for the torts of his servants acting 
outside the scope of thetr employment, unless: 
(a) the master intended the conduct or the conRequences, or 
(b) the master was negligent or reckless, or 
(c) the conduct violated a non-delegable duty of the master, or 
(d) the servant purported to act or to speak on behalf of the principal and 
there was reliance upon apparent authority, or he was aided in accomplishing 
the tort by the existence of the agency relation.208 
Subparts (b) through (d) may trigger school district liability in this 
example. In considering subpart (b) in Burlington Industries, the 
Court stated "[a]n employer is negligent with respect to sexual harass-
ment if it knew or should have known about the conduct and failed to 
stop it."209 Similarly, a school district acts negligently with respect to 
a denial of an equal educational opportunity if it knew or should have 
known of it and failed to address it. Thus, actual knowledge is not 
required and since teachers have direct responsibility for the educa-
tion of students, the school district has actual knowledge of the depri-
vation in this example. Because school districts have a nondelegable 
duty to provide all students with an equal educational opportunity, 
205. RE.'iTATt.:.Mt.:NT (St.:COND) Ot' A OE:-ICY § 219(1) (1957). 
206. Burlwgton indus., 524 U.S. at 756. 
207. Jd. at 757. 
208. RF-'ITATP.'\fF.J11T (SECOND) ot' A GENCY § 219(2) (1957). 
209. Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 759. 
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subpart (c) also supports school district liability where a student is 
deprived of such an opportunity.21o 
Finally, subpart (d), relied upon by the Court in Burlington Indus-
tries, supports vicarious liability when a teacher knows a student's 
classmates are taking her materials, but the teacher does nothing 
about it. Because a teacher has actual power to address the educa-
tional opportunity of his students, the "aided ... by the existence of 
the agency relation"211 prong is most relevant here. Burlington In-
dustries holds that this prong requires "something more than the em-
ployment relation itself," and in that context the something more was 
the ability of a supervisor to take "a tangible employment action 
against a subordinate."212 By analogy, here the something more 
would be the teacher's ability to take a tangible education action 
against the student, such as the failure to provide an equal educa-
tional opportunity. Like with the supervisor in Burlington Industries, 
the injury suffered by the student, denial of an equal educational op-
portunity, "could not have been inflicted absent the agency rela-
tion."2t3 While the student here complains of inaction by the teacher, 
the teacher really takes an active role because he decides to proceed 
with his class, knowing some students do not have the required mater-
ials. The Court says a tangible employment action "in most cases in-
210. The lower court in Dads u. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 120 F.3d 1390, 1399-00 
n.13 (11th Cir. 1997), said there is no nondelegable duty to eliminate student-
student harassment because students are not agents of the school board. This 
misses the point because the nondelegable duty is to provide all students with an 
equal educational opportunity and it is the agents of the school-superintendent, 
principal , teachers and others-who fail in this duty. The source of the distraction 
is not determinative. See, e.g., Carabba v. Anacortes Sch. Dist. No. 103, 435 P.2d 
936, 946-47 (Wash. 1967)(holding specifically that a school district was liable for 
the negligence of a referee who failed to notice an illegal hold on the plaintiff in a 
wrestling match; and generally that school districts owe a nondelegable duty to 
provide protection to students). 
211. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGE:-ICY § 219(2)(d). 
212. Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 2268-69; see also Kracunas v. lona College, 119 
F.3d 80, 87 (2nd Cir. 1997Xciting section 219(2)(d) where a college student al-
leged harassment by a professor, and holding that the professor acted as the 
school's agent in his role of professor, the school placed him in a position of au-
thority vis a vis his students, and "his blatant abuse of that authority ... (was] 
sufficient under agency principles to impute liability to (the colleget); Lipsett v. 
University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 900 n.21 (1st Cir. 1988) (noting in a suit 
by a participant in a surgical residency trainmg program that a supervisor who 
sexually harasses a subordinate is almost always aided by the agency relation-
ship). But see Smith v. Metropolitan Sch. Dist. Perry Township, 128 F.3d 1014, 
1029-30 {7th Cir. 1997)(holding that teacher harassment of a student was not 
accomplished through conduct associated with the agency status and there was 
no evidence any school official had actual knowledge of the relationship); Canu-
tiJlo lndep. Sch. Dist. v. Leija, 101 F.3d 393,400-03 {5th Cir. 1996)(holding school 
district liable for harassment of a student by a teacher because management-
level official knew or should have known of the teacher's misconduct). 
213. Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 761. 
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flicts direct economic harm."214 A tangible education action, such as 
denial of required materials, is less likely to inflict a direct economic 
harm but it is just as tangible and its adverse effect on the goal of 
school attendance (gain an education) is just as direct as the effect of 
harassment on the goal of employment (obtain wages). 
Though the decision in Davis is important and a step in the right 
direction, the majority is unnecessarily cautious. As in Gebser, there 
is more concern for the schools and their financial condition than for 
the victims of harassment. Title IX, like Title VI, is so clearly about 
equal educational opportunity that any deprivation of such an oppor-
tunity, not corrected by school officials if they knew or should have 
known of it, should be actionable. Instead of imposing an affirmative 
obligation on school officials to assure an equal educational opportu-
nity, Davis may encourage them to bury their heads in an effort to 
avoid "actual knowledge" of a deprivation of such an opportunity. Of 
course, there will be difficult proof problems in some cases and schools 
will have to devote resources to defending harassment claims. How-
ever, school officials have the ability to avoid liability by aggressive 
policies and actions designed to protect students from a deprivation of 
equal opportunity caused by the actions of other students. 
c. Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWAJ 
The VAWA215 provides a cause of action for victims of a "crime of 
violence motivated by gender,"216 where the underlying act of violence 
constitutes a felony under state or federal law .211 Cases have held 
that proof of gender motivation resembles proof of sex discrimination 
under Title VII. To satisfy the "crime of violence" requirement, there 
must be "an act or series of acts that would constitute a felony against 
the person ... and that would come within the meanmg of State or 
Federal offenses described in [18 U.S.C. § 16)."218 Sexual harassment 
may or may not involve conduct that would constitute a felony under 
state or federal law. Therefore, while sexual harassment is generally 
"motivated by gender," only the more serious type of harassment will 
be actionable under the VAWA Victims of sexual harassment and 
abuse are beginning to assert claims under the VAWA,219 usually in 
conjunction with other claims. 
214 ld. at 767. 
215 42 U.S.C. * 13981 0994l; see Brzonkala L'. Virgmw Polytechnic lnst. and State 
Uruv. , 169 1<'.3d 820 14th Cir ), cert. grorlltd United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 
11 (1999)(holding that the VAWA is unconstitutional because it exccros the power 
of Congress under the Commerce Clause). 
216. 42 U.S.C. § 1398l!c)Cl994). 
217 Set 42 U.S.C. § 139811d)(2)119941. 
218 42 u.s.c. § 1398l·d)(2)(1994). 
219. See, e.g., Brzonkaln v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. and State Univ., 169 F.3d 820 
(4lh Cir.); Doc v. Hartz, 134 F.3d 1339 18th Cir. 1998>; Erio;on v. Syracuse Univ., 
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While the VAWA provides a cause of action against student perpe-
trators, it is not clear whether a school corporation can be held liable 
under the VAWA for the actions of students.22o When a VAWA plaintiff 
e tablishes liability, she can recover damages, both compensatory and 
punitive, injunctive relief and attorney fees. 
B. Private Schools-Feder al Claims 
Because of the state action requirement, victims of racial and sex-
ual harassment will not be able to seek relief based on the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and section 1983. 
However, the remaining federal claims discussed above do not require 
state action and, therefore, application of these laws to harassment in 
private schools generally should be the same as their application to 
harassment in public schools.22I 
C. State Law Claims Against Schools and Student 
Perpetrators 
There are several potential state law claims arising out of peer har-
assment in schools. Most state constitutions contain a provision simi-
lar to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and 
some have a special provision relating to educational opportunity. 
Like Fourteenth Amendment claims, state constitution claims will 
generally be limited to public schools because of the state action re-
quirement. Some states also have civil rights statutes that address 
race and sex discrimination in schools. Depending on the scope of 
such statutes, they may apply to harassment in elementary and secon-
dary schools. In addition, there are a number of common law claims 
that may be available, depending on state law and the nature of the 
harassment. These include assault and battery, intentional infliction 
of emotional distress, tortious interference with the educational rela-
tionship, negligence/failure to protect students, and negligent hiring 
and/or retention. 
45 F . Supp. 2d 344 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Liu v. Striuli, 36 F. Supp. 2d 452 (D.R.I. 
1999); McCann v. Rosquist, 998 F. Supp. 1246 CD. Utah 1998); Truong v. Smith, 
28 F. Supp. 2d 626 (D. Colo. 1998); Ziegler v. Ziegler, 28 F. Supp. 2d 601 (E.D. 
Wash. 1998); Braden v. Piggly Wiggly, 4 F . Supp. 2d 1357 (M.D. Ala. 1998); Fin-
ley v. Higbee Co., 1 F . Supp. 2d 701 (N.D. Ohio 1998); Mattison v. Click Corp. of 
America, 1998 WL 32597 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 27, 1998); Crisonino v. New York City 
Hous. Auth., 985 F. Supp. 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Anisimov v. Lake, 982 F. Supp. 
531 (N.D. III . 1997); Newton v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. Consol., 958 F. Supp. 248 
(W.D.N.C. 1997). 
220. Respondeat superior liability under the VAWA is discussed, but not decided, in 
Braden u. Piggly Wiggly, 4 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1362 (M.D. Ala. 1998). 
221. In cases against private schools, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) is not available to en-
force regulations adopted pursuant to Title VI or Title IX. See supra note 2. 
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1. State Constitutions 
Most state constitutions have a provision similar to the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend.ment.222 For example, the In-
diana Constitution states: "Equal privileges - The General Assembly 
shall not grant to any citizen, or class of citizens, privileges or immu-
nities, which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citi-
zens."223 While it has rejected the U.S. Supreme Court's approach, 
i.e., utilizing different levels of scrutiny depending on the nature of 
the classification and the deprivation, in interpreting the Equal Pro-
tection Clause,224 the Indiana Supreme Court has not yet demon-
strated that the results will be significantly different under the "equal 
privileges" provision in the Indiana Constitution. 
Assuming victims' rights are no greater under their state's consti-
tutional equivalent of the federal equal protection clause, the broad 
remedies available under section 1983 may make the federal claim 
more attractive than the state claim. However, it may be easier to 
hold the school corporation liable under state law based on respondeat 
superior. Further, there may be situations where a victim wants to 
file an action in state court and reliance exclusively on the state con-
stitution would preclude removal225 by the defendants. 
Some states have a constitutional provision that expressly ad-
dresses equality in elementary and secondary education.226 Again, 
the Indiana Constitution provides an example: 
Knowledge and learning, generally diffused throughout a community, be-
ing essential to the preservation of a free government; it shall be the duty of 
the General Assembly ... to provide, by law, for a general and uniform system 
of Common Schools, wherein the tuition shall be without charge, and equally 
open to aJ1.227 
While there are few cases interpreting this section, the plain meaning 
of the language suggests it could be used to address a race-based or a 
gender-based deprivation of an equal educational opportunity. 
222. See, e.g., Antz. Co!'ST. art. II, § 13; CAL. CoNST. art. I, § 7; Ft.A. CoNST. art. I, § 2; 
ILL. Co:-~sT. art I,§ 2; MICH. CoNST. art. I, § 2; NM CoNST. art. 2, § 18; NY CoNST. 
art 1, § 11; OH Col'ST. art. I, § 2; SD CoNST. art. 6, § 18; Tex. CoMIT. art. 1, § 3. 
223 l.No. CoNsT., art. I, § 23. 
224. See, e.g., Collins v. Day, 644 N.E.2d 72 (Ind. 1994). 
225. Removal from state court to federal court is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1441-44 
(1994) and is generally limited to cases that could have been filed in federal court. 
226. See, e.g., MICH . CONST., art. VIII,§ 2; CAL. CONST., art. I,§ 31; MoNT. CoNST., art. 
X, § 1; N.J. CoNST., art. I,§ 5. 
227. l.Nu. CoNsT., art. VII,§ 1. 
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2. State Civil Rights Statutes 
Many states have a civil rights statute prohibiting race and sex 
discrimination, however, such state laws vary widely.22s Some state 
statutes specifically address discrimination in educational institu-
tions.229 While it is unlikely that state civil rights statutes will pro-
vide relief where the federal civil rights laws do not, in considering a 
claim based on harassment it is worth consulting such state laws. It is 
important to determine whether the relevant state law reaches dis-
crimination or harassment in education, whether it provides for ad-
ministrative enforcement, whether it provides for a private right of 
action, and the type of relief available. 
3. State Tort Claims 
In most jurisdictions, there are tort claims available against the 
students engaged in the harassment, or their parents.230 In many sit-
uations, however, such claims are not worth pursuing because of the 
limited resources of such defendants. Where there is a chance of re-
covery, or the harassment continues because school officials refuse to 
address it, there may be reason to pursue these claims. Tort theories 
to be considered include assault and battery,231 intentional or negli-
228. See, e.g., lND. CoDE § 22-9-1-2 (1999); N.Y. Crvn. R101ITS LAw § 40 (McKinney 
1992); MrcH. Co~1P. LAws ANN. § 37.2102 (West 1985 & Supp. 1999); MINN. STAT. 
ANN. § 363.12 (West 1991 & Supp. 1999); N .J . STAT. ANN. § 10:1-3 (West 1993). 
229. See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 14.18.010 (Michie 1999); CAL. Eouc. CooE § 200 (West 
1994 & Supp. 1999); CoNN. GE~. STAT. ANN. § 10-15c (West 1996 & Supp. 1998); 
D.C. CoDE ANN. § 1-2511 (1999); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 228.2001 (West 1998); IND. 
ConE § 20-8.1-2-1 (1999); IowA CoDE ANN. § 216.9 (West 1994); LA. REv. STAT. 
ANN.§ 17:1941 and§ 17:111 (West 1982 & Supp. 1999); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. 
ch. 151C, § 2 (West 1996); N.Y. EDuc. LAw §§ 3201-a (McKinney 1995) and 313 
(McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1999); MicH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 37.2402 (West 1985); 
MONT. Coo£ ANN. § 49-2-307 (1999); NED. REV. STAT. § 79-2,116 (Reissue 1999); 
N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 18A:36-20 (West 1999); OR. REv. STAT.§ 659.150 (1989 & Supp. 
1998); 24 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 5002 (West 1992 & Supp. 1999); 24 PA. STAT. 
M"N. tit. 24, § 20-2014-A (West 1992); R.I. GEN. LAws § 16-38-1.1 (1999); S.D. 
CoorFlED LAws § 20-13-22 (Michie 1995); TEx. EDUCATION CoDE ANN. § 1.002 
(West 1996); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 1 (Supp. 1999); WASHINGTON REv. CoDE 
ANN. § 28A640.010 (West 1997); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 118.13 (West 1999). 
230. See, e.g., CAL. Crv. CoDE§ 1714.1 (West 1998); !No. CooE § 34-31-4-1 (1999); 740 
ILL. CoMP. STAT.§ 115/3 & 115/5 (West 1998); N.Y. GEN. Osuo. LAw§ 3-112 (Mc-
Kinney 1989 & Supp. 1999); Omo REv. CooE ANN.§ 3109.10 (West 1995 & Supp. 
1999); TEX. FAM. CooE ANN. § 41.001-002 (West 1996); TEX. FAM. CooE ANN. 
§ 41.003 (West 1996 & Supp. 2000); WASn. REV. CoDE ANN.§ 4.24.190 (West 1988 
& Supp. 2000); W.VA. CoDE§ 55-7A-2 (1994 & Supp. 1999). 
231. See RESTATEMRNT (SECOND) oF ToRTS§§ 13, 18, and 21 (1965); W. PAOE KEETON 
ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS 39-42 & 43-46 (5th ed. 1984); 
see, e.g., Archer v. EEOC, 30 F. Supp. 2d 600 (E .D.N.Y. 1998); Kelley v. Worley, 
29 F. Supp. 2d 1304 (M.D. Ala. 1998); Grozdanich v. Leisure Hills Health Ctr., 
Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 953 (D. Minn. 1998); Davis v. Palmer Dodge West, Inc., 977 F . 
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gent infliction of emotional distress,232 and tortious interference with 
the educational relationship, which is in the nature of a contract be-
tween the school and student.2aa Claims against the school corpora-
tion are more likely to result in a recovery of damages, but 
establishing liability is more difficult. Aside from a duty to provide an 
equal educational opportunity, schools have a duty to supervise and 
protect students.2a1 This duty arises from the special relationship be-
tween a school and its students. 
While there is no general duty "to control the conduct of a third 
person as to prevent him from causing physical harm to another," 
there is such a duty when a "special relation exists."23fi Courts have 
relied on this and related sections of the Restatement in holding that 
school corporations may be liable for injuries to students caused by the 
conduct of other students.2as Another section of the Restatement, im-
posing a duty on one with "custody of another under circumstances 
such as to deprive the other of his normal power of self-protection" to 
control the conduct of third persons,237 can be applied to student-stu-
dent harassment because a student while in school is deprived of the 
protection of her parents or guardian.2as 
Supp. 917 <S.D Ind. 1997); Barnard v City of Chicago Heights, 692 N.E.2d 733 
!Ill. App. Ct 1998). 
232. See IU:~;TATU.tt;.ST (SF..coxn) m· Tmns § 46 0965); W. PAGJ:; lua:Toz.> ET AL., PRoS-
SER A."\D Ku:ror-; o:-. TIIF. LAw 011 ToRTs 54-66 & 359-65 (5th ed. 1984>; Hartsell v. 
Duplex Producl.$, Inc., 123 F.3d 766 (4th Cir. 1997). 
233. See Rt:sTATJ:;J.\lliNT (SRCOKD) m· ToRTS§ 766 (1965); see a[SQ Bochnowski v. Peo-
ples Fed. Sav. and Loan A.c;.c1'n, 571 N.E.2d 282 !Ind. 1991) (regarding interference 
with employment relationship). 
234. See generally RE>.'TATF.:O.tENT (St:COND) OF ToRTS §§ 314, 315, 320 (1965); st>e a[SQ 
Doe v. School Admin. Dist. No. 19, 66 F. Supp. 2d 57, 68 (D Me. 1999Xholding 
that school owed a duty to the plaintiff to mvesligat.e claims of sexual 
misconduct). 
235. RF.ST.\Tt:"'tE:o-.-r !St:col'.-o) of" ToRTS § 315 (1965). 
236. See, e.g., Garcia v. City of New York, 646 N.Y.S.2d 508 (?\.Y. Sup. Ct. 1996); Todd 
M. v. Richard L., 696 A.2d 1063 (Conn Sup. Ct. 1995); Turner v. Central Local 
Sch. Dist., _ N.E.2d , 1995 WL 442498 <Ohio Ct. App., July 27, 1995); 
Mirand v. City of New York, 598 N.Y.S.2d 464 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993); Logan v. City 
of New York, 543 N.Y.S.2d 661 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989); Leger v. Stockton Unified 
Sch. Dist., 202 Cal. App. 3d 1448 (1988); Comuntzis v. Pinellas County Sch. Bd., 
508 So. 2d 750 <Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987); District of Columbia v. Doe, 524 A.2d 30 
(D.C. 1987 1; Rodriguez v. Inglewood Unified Sch. Dist., 186 Cal App. 3d 707 
(1986>; Fazzolara v. Portland Sch. Dist. No. 1J, 717 P.2d 1210 !Or. Ct. App. 1986); 
School City of Gary v. Claudio, 413 N.E.2d 628 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980); McLeod v. 
Grant County Sch. Dist. No. 128, 255 P.2d 360 (Wa~h. 1953). 
237. See R ESTATF.:\H:I'o'T <Su.:mm) OF ToRT:;§ 320 (1965). The Court. in DacJls cited this 
as an indication of the common law placing "t;ehools on notice that they may be 
held responsible under state law for the ar failure to protect ~;tudent.s from the 
tortious acts of third parties." 119 S. Ct. at 1671-72. 
238. See generally W. p ,,m: Kt::t:TO:-< ET Al4, PROSSER t\1\D KEETON ON THF LAw OF 
ToRTS§§ 33 & 56 (5th ed., 1984). 
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Therefore, while it is necessary to consult the law of the relevant 
jurisdiction,239 state tort law is a possible source of a claim against a 
school corporation where a student has been harassed by another stu-
dent. Where state tort claims are available, they can be combined 
with federal claims, either in state court or in federal court based on 
supplemental jurisdiction.240 
V. CONCLUSION 
When student-student racial or sexual harassment is properly 
viewed as interference with the victims' right to equal educational op-
portunities, then it is more likely to be viewed as a serious matter that 
cannot be brushed aside as normal teasing. Similarly, when such har-
assment is viewed in this manner, the applicability of constitutional 
and statutory provisions prohibiting race and sex discrimination be-
comes more apparent. The prospect of liability will cause school offi-
cials to take more seriously their duty to take all reasonable steps to 
prevent harassment and, when it occurs despite their best efforts, to 
respond promptly with appropriate corrective/remedial efforts. Race 
and sex discrimination in elementary and secondary education, even 
when it takes the form of harassment by fellow students, cannot be 
tolerated. Courts can help address the problem by showing more con-
cern for the victims and less concern for the financial condition of 
school corporations that tolerate harassment and the resulting depri-
vation of an equal educational opportunity. 
239. See Allan E. Korpela, Annotation, Tort Ltability of Public Schools and lnstllu-
tions of Higher Learning for Injuries Caused by Acts of Fellow Students, 36 
A.L.R.3d 330 (1971 & Supp. 1999). 
240. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (codifying common law doctrine of pendent jurisdiction). 
